

THE SOUL THEORY **OF** **THE BUDDHISTS**

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With a Preface

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Preface

Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa is rightly considered to be one of the most monumental works on Buddhist philosophy. He flourished in the 5th Century A. D. His famous work sums up all the important concepts of Buddhist philosophy, particularly the teachings of the Vaibhāṣika school.

Attached to the last chapter of his work is an appendix entitled, "Aṣṭamakośasthānasambuddhaḥ pudgalviniścayaḥ" It deals with the Buddhist denial of the existence of soul. An English translation of this part by Professor Th. Stcherbatsky was published under the title "The Soul Theory of the Buddhists" in 1920.

The above has been long out of print. Shri Kishore Chand Jain, the enterprising proprietor of Bharatiya Vidyā Prakāśana, is bringing out a reprint of the book.

The present edition is only a reprint of the original one. A few linguistic mistakes which appeared to be too glaring have been corrected.

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The Soul theory of the Buddhists.

In that magnificent compendium of Buddhist doctrine, which the illustrious Vasubandhu compiled at the close of the V century A. D. under the title of *Abhidharmakośa* we find attached to the last chapter, as a kind of conclusion of the whole work, a special appendix devoted to the much controverted question about the Buddhist denial of the existence of Soul¹. The work opens with the statement that in order to attain Salvation a thorough discrimination of the Elements (*dharma*) which are active in the process of life is indispensable, and then proceeds to make an exposition of these Elements, their classification and characteristics (I and II chapters). It then goes on in the III chapter to enumerate the different kinds of living beings or worlds produced by the play of the elementary forces just described. The following two chapters (IV and V) are devoted to an investigation into the general cause which brings the world into movement and the special causes that are feeding the process of life (*karma* and *anuśaya*). Thus these five chapters represent what may be termed the statics and dynamics of the ordinary

1 Its full title is : *aṣṭamakośasthānasambaddhaḥ pudgalaviniścayaḥ*.

world process (*duḥkha* and *samudaya*). The remaining three chapters are concerned with the purification of this life or, more precisely, with the pacification of its movement (*nirodha* and *mārga*). Chapter VI contains a picture of the Buddhist Saint (*āryapudgala*) and the last two chapters (VII and VIII) deal with the general and the special causes of saintliness, viz. immaculate wisdom (*prajñā amalā*) and transic meditation (*samādhi*). Among all the analysed elements of existence no Soul i. e. no permanent principle, representing some unity between the separate elements of life, is mentioned. Consciousness (*viññāna*), it is true, occupies a central position, but it is likewise impermanent, and the final extinction of its working is likewise aimed at. Some of the elements necessarily follow upon one another, some are necessarily coexisting i. e. appearing always simultaneously, this process constituting their "mutually interdependent origination" (*pratityasamutpāda*) or life considered as a play of interdependent elementary forces. In concluding his exposition Vasubandhu feels himself called upon to devote, in the special appendix mentioned above, some considerations to the negative part of the whole system, viz. the negation of Soul.

Viewed as a step in the evolution of Indian philosophical thought Buddhism was probably preceded

by a fully developed form of the Sāṃkhya system in the elaborate thoroughly consistent shape of an Indian science (*śāstra*). We are not aware of any cogent argument for submitting to doubt the tradition according to which Buddha studied systematical philosophy under the guidance of two celebrated teachers of that doctrine. From the same traditional source we gather that these teachers probably had already rejected the doctrine of the three primary constituents of matter. Buddha's denial of Soul was a further step in the same direction towards a higher degree of consistency. The position of an eternal passive Soul alongside with an active but unconscious intellect (*buddhi*) is indeed a very weak point in the Sāṃkhya system, a point which invites criticism. The one eternal matter of the Sāṃkhya whose manifestations are in a constant process of change (*nityapariṇāmī*) was converted by Buddha into separate elements which appear into life like momentary flashings without being backed by any eternal substance. Both doctrines are sometimes called radical systems (*ekānta-darśana*), because the one adheres to the doctrine of eternal existence only (*sarvaṃ nityam*), while the other maintains universal impermanence (*sarvaṃ anityam*). It is out of place here to go into a more detailed comparison of both systems. Their close affinity has not escaped the attention of scholars. What I should like

here to insist upon is the fact that a close connexion may be expressed not only by points of similarity, but also by opposition, nay by protest. When Buddha calls the doctrine of an eternal Self "a doctrine of fools" it is clear that he is fighting against an established doctrine. Whenever in his Sermons he comes to speak about Soullessness or Wrong Personalism (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*) a sense of opposition or even animosity is clearly felt in his words. This doctrine along with its positive counterpart—the separate elements that are active in life and whose activity must gradually be suppressed till Eternal Repose is attained—is the central point of the whole bulk of Buddhist teaching and Mrs. Caroline Rhys Davids rightly remarks, "how carefully and conscientiously this antisubstantialist position had been cherished and upheld". We may add that the whole of the history of Buddhist philosophy can be described as a series of attempts to penetrate more deeply into this original intuition of the Buddha, what he himself believed to be his great discovery.

When considering the general lines of the later evolution of Buddhist philosophy one is involuntarily reminded of what has been said by one of the leaders of modern thought with respect to philosophy in general. "The more we try to penetrate into the main idea of a philosopher ... we feel that it imperceptibly

becomes transfigured at our hands". The original intuition of a philosopher may be very simple, but he spends the whole of his life in bringing it into a clear formula. No sooner has he expressed what he had in his mind than he feels himself obliged to correct his formula, then to correct this correction and so on. "All the complexity of his doctrine which thus is capable of an infinite evolution is nothing else than an incommensurability between his primitive intuition and the means to express it which were at his disposal"¹. The oldest schism in the Congregation had already a bearing upon these abstruse philosophical questions. The Kathāvattu begins its exposition of divergent views by a long discussion of the question about the possible reality of Soul. The schools of the Āryasammitīyas and Vātsīputrīyas were inclined to interpret the doctrine of Soullessness in a sense which admitted some, albeit very feeble, unity in the elements of a personality. Their opponents the Sarvāstivādins denied even that. They maintained that separate elements were really existing in all the three times, i. e. not only were the momentary flashings of some elements composing the present moment really existing, but the past and future flashings were also somehow existent. Soullessness for them was

¹ H. Bergson. L'intuition philosophique. Revue de Metaph. 1911, p. 810.

equal to the whole infinite mass of elements past, present and future. Nāgārjuna made a further step in erecting this Soullessness or Voidness into an entity *sui generis*. The consequence was that the elements whose interdependence was an acknowledged fact were denied any real substantial existence (*niḥsvabhāva*). This voidness developed (*vivarta*) in an inconceivable manner into the manifoldness of phenomenal life. Aśvagoṣa² conceived Soullessness as a kind of general consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) of which the separate elements were so many aspects, thus giving to the primitive teaching an idealistic interpretation. With Vasubandhu Buddhist philosophy receives once more an idealistic interpretation to which the greatest Buddhist philosophers Dignāga and Dharmakīrti adhered with slight modifications. Soullessness was later on conceived in a pantheistic sense and personified as the primeval Buddha Vairocana. The same can be maintained with regard to its theistic conception personified as Buddha Amitābha whose worship gave rise to a new religion.

All the different forms in which Buddhism presents

2 The author of Mahāyānaśāradhotaśāstra. The chronological argument which Prof. H. Jacobi and myself have drawn from the fact that Buddhist Idealism is alluded to in the Nyāyasūtras must be corrected, since, as it would seem, idealistic views emerge in the run of Buddhist philosophy more than once.

itself at present and in the past may be viewed as so many attempts to reach by sympathetic intuition the original idea of the Master. An analysis of the elements of life is presupposed by all of them. Vasubandhu composed his treatise according not to his own views, but mainly (*prāyeṇa*) in accordance with the teaching of the Vaibhāṣikas of Kāśmere. His plan was to expose his own views in a later work of which he only succeeded in composing the mnemonic verses. The appendix mentioned above seems to be a kind of intermediate part, a link between both these works.

It seemed desirable to give a translation of it at present, without awaiting the time when a translation of the whole of the Abhidharmakośa could be carried through press. It deals with the central point of all Buddhism and is remarkable for its precision and the beautiful style for which Vasubandhu is renowned in the Buddhist world. European scholars will witness their great Indian predecessor at the same work of elucidating the difficult points of doctrine to which they also have devoted many efforts. They will see him making just the same references to passages in Buddha's sermons which they invoked in support of their solution. They will see that there is no "glaring contradiction" between the scientific doctrine of Soullessness and what in the popular style of the Sermons appears

as a transmigration of Souls. They will give credit to the universal conviction of learned Buddhists that the Buddha in his sermons very often had recourse to figurative speech in order to approach the simple souls of uneducated people. They will, as I hope, find in the *abhidharma* what they were in vain looking for in the diffuse style of popular sūtras—"la forte structure d'une théorie autonome, sortant toute armée d'une speculation maîtresse d'elle même"¹.

The translation is made from the Tibetan text of the Bstan-hgyur, vol. 63, f. 93—109. The figures in margin refer to the Peking edition of our Asiatic Museum, the figures in brackets to the Japanese edition of Hiuen-Tsang's translation. Some indispensable explanations and additions have been borrowed from Yaśomitra's commentary, a literal version is sometimes added in the notes. Our translation has been carefully compared with the Chinese translations of Paramārtha and Hiuen-Tsang by the much regretted late prof. O. O. Rosenberg whose premature demise just at the beginning of a scientific career full of the greatest promise is a heavy blow upon our so much tried country. In translating the technical terms we have mainly followed the conclusions of his first and alas! last work: *Problems of Buddhist Philosophy*, Petrograd. 1917.

¹ E. Senart in *Melanges Harlez*, p. 281.

We subjoin a table of the Elements of existence and their different classifications. This table must always be present to the mind when dealing with Buddhist conceptions.

I classification into 5 groups (*Skandha*) of elements, the substrates of a personal life : 1. physical elements 2. feelings 3. ideas, 4. volitions 5. general consciousness.

II classification into 12 bases of cognition (*āyatana*), i. e. all things cognizable :

6 perceptive faculties.	Their 6 objects.
1. sense of vision	7. colour and shape
2. auditory sense	8. sounds
3. olfactory sense	9. odours
4. sense of taste	10. tastes
5. sense of touch	11. tactile objects
6. intellect	12. the remaining 64 elements (<i>dharmāḥ</i>).

The elements of matter are included in No. 11. No. 12 includes 1) 3 eternal elements : space and two kinds of non-existence, 2) mental faculties : volitions, feelings, ideas, passions, virtues etc. 46 in number, 3) general energies or processes : birth, decay etc. 14 in number, 4) a special physical element, termed non-in-timation No. 1—5 and 7—11 of this classification

correspond to No. 1 of the former, No. 6 to No. 5, No. 2—4 of the former are included in No. 12 of the bases.

III classification in 18 component parts of existence (*dhātu*) is the same as the foregoing one with the addition of 6 kinds of consciousness, viz. 13 visual—, 14 auditory—, 16 consciousness of taste, 17 tactile—and 18 intellectual i. e. non sensuous or abstract consciousness.

Other current classifications are: 1) mind and body (*nāmarūpa*), 2) energies and substances (*samskāra dravya*), 3) matter, mind and energies (*rūpa jñāna cittaviprayuktasamskāra*).

This makes together 75 elements: 3 eternal ones, 1 consciousness, 46 mental faculties, 14 general forces, and 11 physical elements.

Other schools give different numbers, the Yogācāras—100 etc.

Individuality examined.

Appendix to the VIII chapter of Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa.

[§ 1. Introductory].

Our Teacher is no more,
Of Universe the Eyes are closed,
Those who have witnessed Him are gone,
And troubled by false reasoning is our Religion !
For the Supreme Lord has entered Final Repose,
Followed by those who faithfully
This Holy Doctrine have maintained.
The World is left without a Guide.
Unchecked Corruption nowadays
Is freely spreading and defeating Virtue.
The times are come
When flooded by the rising tide of Ignorance
Buddha's Religion seems to breathe its last !
Therefore, if for Salvation you do care,
Do not be heedless !¹

[§ 2. Question stated.]

Is there, indeed, no other Salvation than (within the pale of Buddhism) ?

No, there is none !—Why ?—Because (all other doctrines) hold to the erroneous view of the real existence of a Soul. The term "Soul" is not regarded

by them as a conventional term applied to What is only a flux of elements². They maintain instead that the Soul is a Reality quite independent from (the elements). This idea of a Self is at the root of every evil passion (and through its action Salvation becomes impossible).³

But how can it be proved that the (various) terms which are used to designate a Soul refer to a flux of elements only and that there is no other (reality) denoted by them ?

This is deduced from the fact that there neither is a direct perception nor an inference (in favour of the existence of the Soul). Elements really existing, when present, are subject to direct perception, as f. i. the six kinds of objects: (colours, sounds, smells etc.) and intellect (itself, in the preceding moment)⁴. Otherwise their existence may be inferred as f. i. the five senses- (sight etc.). The (existence) of the latter is inferred as follows :

General proposition. (Experience) shows, that although the (general) causes be present, the effect is not produced in absence of its special cause, but it is produced, when the latter in (also) present.

Example. As f. i. a plant (is produced from its special cause—the seed).

Application. Experience shows that although the object be present and attention aroused, (it nevertheless sometimes happens) that perception is not produced, while (in other cases) it is produced.

Example. With the blind, the deaf etc. (it is not—) and with those not blind, not deaf etc. (it is produced).

Conclusion. Therefore it is established beyond any doubt that here also a special cause is either absent or present. This special cause is the sense faculty (of sight etc.)⁵. This is (a valid) inference. But with regard to the Soul no such (inference is possible). Consequently there is no Soul.

But then the "Individual"⁶ the existence of which is admitted by the school of the Vātsīputrīyas⁷ what does it represent ?

First of all we must examine the question, whether they admit (the existence of the Individual) as a reality or as an existence merely nominal ?

Vātsīputrīya. What is an actual, and what a nominal existence ?

Vasubandhu. If something exists by itself (as a separate element), it has an actual existence, as f. i. colour and other (ultimate elements of matter and mind)⁸. But if something represents a combination (of such elements) it is a nominal existence, as f. i. milk,

Vātsīputriya. (So far I do not object). But what follows from this ?

Vasubandhu. It follows first of all, that if Soul is an actual existence, it must have an essence of its own and must be something different from the elements of a personal life, (just as these elements differ from one another). Secondly you must indicate its cause, for otherwise it would be an existence uncaused, (an eternal being), and you would thus become guilty of professing an heretical view, (which is contrary to your own system). Moreover (such an eternal, uncaused and unchanging being) would be without any practical efficiency,⁹ (as if unexisting). But if on the contrary you admit it to be a nominal existence, (as a current designation for the elements of a personal life), I too will admit it, and say "so it is !"

Vātsīputriya. We do not maintain that it is an absolute reality, but we neither accept it to be a nominal one.

Vasubandhu. What is it then ?

Vātsīputriya. We give the name of an Individual to something conditioned by the elements (as far as they are organized) at a given moment in a personal life¹⁰.

Vasubandhu. These words are so to say blind ! As long as their meaning is not disclosed, I do not under-

stand them ! What does it mean to be "conditioned" ? (Does it mean conditioned by perception or conditioned by existence ?) In the first case the meaning would be : having perceived some elements (I call them an Individual). Then an Individual would be only another name for the elements. Just as when I perceive a liquid of a definite colour (smell, taste etc.), I call it milk, though it is nothing else than these elements only. But if 'conditioned' means that (the use of the term Individual) is founded on (the existence) of elements, then these elements would represent the cause for our using this term. The difficulty remains the same.

[§ 3. *The relation of the Individual to its elements, exemplified by the relation of fire to fuel.*]

Vātsīputriya. We do not use the term ("conditioned") in that sense.

Vasubandhu. In what sense then ?

Vātsīputriya. (We use it) just as we use the word "fire", (in applying it to something) conditioned by the presence of burning fuel.

Vasubandhu. And what does it mean that the use of the word fire is conditioned by burning fuel ?

Vātsīputriya. If there is no fuel, neither (is there anything) we can apply the name of fire to. Nevertheless we neither can maintain that fire is something

different from burning fuel nor can we assert that it is the same. Were it altogether different, fuel could not contain any caloric element, (which we know it always does contain)¹¹. But if there were no difference at all, then the substance that burns and the something that sings would be (one and the same substance). This illustrates (the relation between the Individual and its elements). If the elements of a personal life are absent, we do not use the term Individual. Nevertheless we neither can maintain that the Individual is something different from its component elements, nor can we assert that they are identical. (In the first case) the consequence would be an eternal (Soul), (in the second) its total absence.

Vasubandhu. Indeed ! Then please explain what in your opinion is fuel and what is fire ? Thereupon I should like you to explain, what it does mean that the name fire is applied to something "conditioned" by the presence of burning fuel ?

Vātsīputriya. This requires no explanation ! Fuel is the matter that burns and fire is that which sings. That is all !

Vasubandhu. This is just the thing I should like you to explain : what is the matter that is consumed by fire, and what is it that consumes it ?

Vātsīputriya. Now, as used in common life (these

terms have the meaning of wood and flames). When wood or any other fuel is bursting into flames, people say : "this is fuel", "it is burning". With regard to the flames they say : "this is fire", "it sings". Flames and intense heat are the agency which burns i. e. destroys fuel in that sense that the continuity of its existence undergoes a change, (it is turned into ashes). But (from the scientific point of view), both fuel and fire are composed of (exactly the same set) of eight primary constituents (the sole difference consisting in the circumstance that in fire the caloric element is more prominent than in fuel)¹¹. If the production of fire is conditioned by the presence of fuel, it is just as the production of curds which is conditioned (by the previous existence of milk), or the milk's sour taste which is conditioned by its previous sweet taste.

Vasubandhu. But then, if the expression "conditioned by the existence of fuel" has this meaning, fuel and fire are altogether different things, because they are produced at different moments. If you mean that the production of an Individual is conditioned by its component elements in the same way, then it must be something different from them and at the same time something non-permanent, (since it has a cause). But if you understand the caloric element in the burning fuel to represent alone the fire, and the other three constituents

of matter—which are inseparable from this element—to represent the fuel, then indeed it is established that they must be different, since they differ in substance¹¹. But then how can the name of such a fire be applied to something “conditioned” by the presence of such fuel? Once more you are bound to explain the meaning you attach to the term “conditioned”? This (fuel) is not the cause producing fire, not is it the cause of using the name “fire”. For fire itself is here the cause for applying to it this name.

Vātsīputriya. The term “conditioned” may here be accepted in the sense of a support, or necessarily coexisting element?

Vasubandhu. But if you suppose the elements of a personal life to “support” the Individual, or to be coexisting with him in the same sense (in which the primary constituents of matter are coexisting (or supporting one another), you evidently are admitting a difference between them. (Then indeed it would follow that) no Individual can exist in the absence of its component elements, just as well as no fire can exist in the absence of fuel.

Vātsīputriya. To this we have already answered, that if fire be altogether different from fuel, the latter could not contain any element of heat, (which it always does contain).

Vasubandhu. (Yes, you did say so), but what do you understand by heat? If it is the caloric element fuel never will be the same as heat, since it is (in this case) represented by the other constituents of matter. (They will be as different as one constituent differs from the others).

Vātsīputriya. But then the other coexisting elements may be possessed of heat. In this case it will be established, that they are different from fire, as far as the latter is represented by the caloric element, but they nevertheless will represent heat also, in as much as they will be pregnant with heat. Hence there is no fault in them being different substances, (since they are thus united).

Vasubandhu. You suppose burning wood etc. to represent at the same time the fuel as well as the fire! Again you are obliged to explain what in this case will be the meaning attached to the term “conditioned”. And besides, since there is nothing but the elements to represent the Individual you cannot possibly escape the conclusion that the latter is nothing different (from the elements). Therefore you have not proved that the name Individual is applied to something conditioned by the presence of its elements in the same sense in which the name fire is applied to something conditioned by the presence of fuel.

[§ 4. *The Individual not included in the table of the*

Elements].

Vasubandhu. Further, if the Individual is included as a separate element among the elements of a personal life, then we must admit the existence of a new category of cognizable elements, a fifth category. For the cognizable elements are either impermanent—past, present and future—, or permanent. (That makes four categories). Now if your Individual is an existence neither constantly changing, nor eternal, it will constitute a fifth, intermediate category—an existence neither momentary, nor eternal.¹²

Vātsīputriya. This cannot be maintained.

Vasubandhu. What is it then ?

Vātsīputriya. It is undefinable : it neither does nor does not constitute any fifth category.

Vasubandhu. When we are applying to an idea the name "an Individual", what is the corresponding object ? Is it the elements of a personal life, or is it a (real) Individual ? In the first case we are applying the name to the elements only, since there is no (real) object so called. In the second, why should this name be conditioned by the elements, since it is conditioned by the real Individual itself ?

Vātsīputriya. We maintain that in the presence of all

the elements of a personal life we perceive the object called Individual. Therefore we use this name as conditioned by the elements.

Vasubandhu. But colour too is perceived under the condition that the sense of vision, aroused attention and light be present. Hence you must maintain that it is "conditioned" by them and therefore nominal. (There will be no unconditioned existence altogether).

[§ 5. *How is the Individual's existence cognized*].

Vasubandhu. Now I should like you to answer the following question. There are six kinds of cognition, (five sense-perceptions, according to the number of senses, and one purely mental). By which of them is the Individual cognized ?

Vātsīputriya. We answer : by all the six !

Vasubandhu. How is that to be understood ?

Vātsīputriya. If we have a visual perception of some coloured shape¹³, and if we thereby indirectly cognize the presence of a human Individual, we may maintain that he is cognized by sight. But we neither can admit that he himself is this colour and this shape, nor can we deny it. The same applies (to all the other material elements, voice etc. and also to the mental phenomena¹⁴). If we have a perception of some mental phenomena through the intellect, and if thereby the idea of an in-

telligent being presents itself to our mind, we may maintain that this Individual is cognized by a perception purely mental; but we neither can admit that he himself represents those mental phenomena, nor can we (absolutely) deny it.

Vasubandhu. But if that be true, the same argument may be applied to the cognition of milk and other (composite substances. They include elements of colour, of smell, taste and touch). If we have a direct visual perception of a definite colour (and flat surface), and through it the idea of milk or of water presents itself to our mind, we may maintain that this milk and this water is cognized by sight. But we neither can admit that they themselves are this colour and shape, nor can we absolutely deny it. The same might be said about their elements cognized by smell, taste and touch. We may have a direct perception of these substances through the sense of touch, but we neither can admit that they are themselves this touch nor can we absolutely deny it. Because (if these colour, smell, taste and touch were each of them milk itself or water itself), we should have four different kinds of milk or water. We arrive at the following conclusion: just as milk and water are conventional names (for a set of independent elements), for some colour, (smell, taste and touch) taken together, so is the designation "Individual" but

a common name for the different elements, which it is composed of. But (let us consider the argument more closely). You have said: "if we have a visual perception of some colour and shape, and if we thereby indirectly cognize the presence of a human Individual" etc. Now, what is the meaning of these words? Does it mean that the cognition of the Individual is caused by its visible element, or does it mean that both are cognized simultaneously?

(*Vātsīputrīya*. What is the difference between these two possibilities?)

Vasubandhu. If the visible element is the cause producing the cognition of the Individual, and at the same time we are told, that the latter does not differ from the former, (this must be true of all the other causes too), and since they are not different from the Individual, there neither can be any difference between themselves. Hence we arrive at the absurd conclusion, that the visible element in its turn does not differ from sight, light and attention, since these all are the causes of a visual perception. Now, (take the other possibility): the cognition of the Individual appears at the same time with the cognition of the visible element. The question arises: do we perceive the Individual by that very perception, by which we perceive the visible form, or by another one? In the first case the Individual would

be essentially the same as the visible form, in other words, it would be the name for some visible element only. But then how could we make a distinction between them? How could we tell: "this is the bodily frame" and "this is the Individual itself"? Or how indeed could we surmise that the individual is something as really existing, as the visible element is, if there altogether be no distinction between them? We can assume existence only on the basis of some cognition. What is here said about the visible element, might be extended to all the other elements, mental phenomena included. But supposing the Individual to be cognized by a separate act of perceptive knowledge, then it should be something quite different from the visible element, as both are cognized at different moments, just as blue differs from yellow, or just as two moments (in the existence of the same object) differ from one another. This might also be extended to all other elements, mental phenomena included.

Vātsīputriya. But (there is still another possibility): just as we maintain that the Individual and the visible element are neither different, nor are they identical, we shall extend (the same principle) to their cognitions; they are neither different, nor are they identical!

Vasubandhu. Well (if you go on in this way with the relation of neither different nor identical), you neither

will be capable even of maintaining that (this cognition of an Individual) is a passing phenomenon and this will mean giving up your own tenet, (namely that cognitions are always phenomenal).

Further, if you are in the right and this Individual really exists, but is neither identical nor different from the visible element, why then has the Lord (expressly denied it), declaring that "neither the visible element is the Self nor any other element, consciousness included"? And if the Individual is perceived through sight, what is the objective cause producing such perception? Is it the visible frame, or is it the Individual, or both together? If it is the visible object it cannot possibly be a perception of the Individual, no more than it can be perception of his voice or the like. Because the objective cause of every perception belongs necessarily to its own special field, (a visual perception can be of colour or form only). And if you suppose it to be the Individual itself or the Individual and the body together, you will be contradicted¹⁵ by Scripture, because Scripture lays a stress upon the point that there are only two causes productive of perception. Thus it is declared: "O Brother! when a visual perception is produced, the first cause of it is the faculty of sight, the second a visible object. Why is that? Because the production of all visual perceptions, whatever they may be, is conditioned by

the existence of the faculty of sight and of a visible object." In that case it would likewise follow, that the Individual, (did it exist), would be something changing every moment, for Scripture declares, that "whatever be the active cause or the object of a visual perception, is eo ipso a momentary existence". Now if your Individual is not a visible object, it never will be cognized by sight. As to your theory that the Individual may be cognized by all the six kinds of perception (we must observe, that) if it can be cognized by audition, it must be something quite different from the visible element, as different as sound is from colour. On the other hand if it is cognized by sight it must be something quite different from the voice, as different as colour is from sound. The same argument may be extended to the other sources of cognition. Moreover your theory is in contradiction with the following Scriptural passage : "O, Brahmin ! each of these five sense faculties has its own separate field of action and its own objects because each one experiences its own objects in its own special field¹⁶. One faculty cannot act in the domain of another, or experience objects belonging to it. Thus we have the faculties of sight, of audition, of smell, of taste, of touch and of the intellect. The first five have their proper domain and their own objects each, the faculty of the intellect being the common resort for all." The con-

sequence of this would be that there is altogether no such object as an Individual, and if it does not constitute an object of cognition, it will follow that it cannot be cognized at all.

Vātsīputriya. If this would be the case, then the Individual could not be cognized even by the intellect. (But in its turn this is contradicted by Scripture). It is declared in the Parable of the Six Animals : "the six faculties have each of them a separate field of action, each has a natural propensity towards a special domain of its own and its own special objects." (This propensity belongs to intellect alone, hence we understand this passage to indicate that the faculty of the intellect may cognize every object).

Vasubandhu. This passage does not mention the cognitive faculties in the current sense of the six cognitive faculties, (because it mentions their propensity i. e. a conscious choice). Now the five senses and the (indefinite) consciousness produced by them cannot have any propensity towards visual or other perception. But by their influence mind is attracted and they are followed by definite mental cognitions which are referred to in the above passage under the name of cognitive faculties. As to cognitions (purely) mental which are consequent on the action of the intellect alone, (independently of any influence by the senses, they have their

own special objects and) cannot have any inclination towards a domain which is essentially different from their own. (There can be no common object for all cognitive faculties; the Individual being no special object of any separate faculty cannot be cognized altogether). Therefore your objection is not valid, (your reference to the meaning of the passage in question does not improve your position). And besides Buddha (has given the full list of all existing elements without mentioning any Individual). "O Brethren ! has he declared, I will expose to you the list of all elements which must be well known, thoroughly known. Well known, thoroughly known must be the faculty of vision, its object, its apprehension, its sensation and the feeling whether pleasant, unpleasant or indifferent caused by the sensation of a visual contact" and so on, he goes on enumerating the elements and) concludes with "the feeling arising from a purely mental sensation. This is the list of all the elements of existence that must be well known, that must be thoroughly known".

(*Vātsīputriya*. Buddha speaks in this passage about thorough knowledge. But to apprehend the mere existence of something is not the same as to know thoroughly.)

Vasubandhu. It is clearly stated in the above passage that the elements to be well known, and thoroughly

known are so many and no more. There is no Individual among them. Therefore neither its mere existence can be apprehended, since the indefinite apprehension of an object's mere existence and its subsequent definite cognition always refer to just the same object. This idea of yours that there is an existing Self who through the opening of his eyes contemplates other Selves—this idea it is which is called Wrong Personalism.¹⁹

[§ 6. *Scriptural passages discussed*].

Vasubandhu. In his sermons Buddha lays a stress upon the point, that what is called an Individual is nothing else than the component elements (of a personal life). So it is declared in the Ajita-Sermon : "a visual consciousness depends upon the organ of sight and a visible object. When these three: (object, sense organ and consciousness) combine, a sensation is produced. It is accompanied by a feeling, a representation and a volition. Thus we have four elements that are mental (sensation i. e. indefinite consciousness, feeling, representation and volition), and one, the organ of sight, that is physical. Only so much is meant, when we are speaking of a human being. To these (five sets of elements) different names are being given, such as a sentient being, a man, Manu's progeny, a son of Manu, a child, an Individual, a life, a Soul. If with respect to them the expression is used "he sees this object with his

own eyes" it is false imputation, (there being in reality nobody possessing eyes of his own). In common life with respect to them such expressions are current as : "that is the name of this venerable man, he belongs to such a caste and such a family, he eats such food, this pleases him, he has reached such an age, he has lived so many years, he has died at such an age". These O Brethren ! accordingly are mere words, mere conventional designations.

"Expression are they, (but not truth) !

Real elements have no duration,

Vitality makes them combine,

In mutually dependent apparitions".

Moreover Buddha has declared that one must hold to the definite (direct, technical) meaning of his words. Therefore this their meaning must be examined over and over again. Thus, when it is said : "O Brahmins ! every thing exists", (one must bear in mind) that it likewise has been said, "this refers only to (the elements of existence classified as) the twelve "bases of cognition". Now if this Individual is not to be found among the bases of cognition, it is (eo ipso) proved that it does not exist altogether. If, on the contrary, it is included in them, then it is not admissible to maintain that the Individual is something indefinite, (neither identical nor different from the elements, since the elements and bases are

something definite). Again in one sermon according to the (Vātsiputriyas) themselves, there is a passage running thus : "all the organs of sight that may exist and all the visible objects, that may exist etc. etc."—follows the enumeration of all the twelve bases of cognition— "the Buddha has declared that here (in the twelve bases) they are contained, all without exception ; and he declares that these are the only elements really existing". Among them there is no Individual. Therefore how can the Vātsiputriyas maintain that the Individual is something real ? (They contradict their own Scriptures !) Again in the Bimbisāra-Sermon it is declared : "O Brethren ! (the notion) of "myself and of "mine" is a childish notion of simple uneducated people, who are misled by current expressions¹⁷. There is no Self, nothing mine, nothing except the separate elements of the trouble of life in their vanishing apparitions"¹⁸. And the holy nun Śilā¹⁹—Māra having started the discussion²⁰—gives the following answer :

"A sentient being does exist, you think, O Māra ?

You are misled by false conception.

This bundle of elements is void of Self,

In it there is no sentient being,

Just as a set of wooden parts

Receives the name of carriage,

So do we give to elements

The name of fancied being"²¹.

other collections, a text which neither disagrees with Scripture nor with the theory of Elements²⁹, this is a quite arbitrary proceeding and nothing more! And then, the (well-known) passage "the elements contain no Self", is it likewise omitted (in their own Collections)?

Vātsīputriya. But in our opinion it means that the Individual is neither one of the elements nor is it something outside the elements, (as stated above).

Vasubandhu. In this case (if nothing corresponds to it) the Individual would never have existed (even) as a mental idea³⁰, (since every idea must have something for its objective source). It is expressly stated in Scripture, that there are always two causes for every cognition (a receptive faculty and an apprehended object).

(*Vātsīputriya*. And how do you explain the fact that in the absence of a Self there nevertheless arises an idea of a Self?)

Vasubandhu. It is stated (in other texts) that "the Self corresponds to a non-Self, (to something existing, but not to a real Self). It is a wrong idea, a wrong apprehension and a wrong doctrine.

Vātsīputriya. How indeed did you come to know that the false idea of a Self corresponds not to a Self, but to a non-Self?

Vasubandhu. And what (in your opinion) does the expression "non-Self" mean (in Scripture)?

Vātsīputriya. (It is meant to designate all the elements of phenomenal existence, classified as they are in five aggregates, the substrates of a personal life), or in twelve bases of cognition, or in eighteen component parts of existence.

Vasubandhu. Well, (f. i. the bodily frame being an element must be designated as a non-Self, and it follows that you are contradicting your own statement made above), the statement namely that the Individual is neither identical with the bodily frame, nor is it something different³¹. (If the bodily element does not differ from the Self, it cannot represent the non-Self).

In another Sermon it is declared: "O Brethren! some Buddhists as well as some Brahmins entertain the idea of a Self. But you must know that all such ideas refer exclusively to the five mundane groups (of elements, the substrates of a person's phenomenal life: its bodily frame, its feelings, its notions, its will, and its general consciousness)". Therefore all such cognitions of a Self invariably refer to the non-Self.

[§ 7. *Is the Buddha a real personality*].

Vasubandhu. Accordingly Scripture declares: "(there are saints, who can) remember their various previous existences, but in doing so, all that they did remember, all they are remembering or will remember about in

future refers simply to these five groups of mundane elements.

Vātsīputriya. If such be the import of this text, why then does Buddha declare (in his Sermons): "in a former existence I have had such a bodily frame". (Using the term "I" implies the existence of a Self).

Vasubandhu. He alludes in these words to the fact which has been expressed in the (just cited) passage. "there are saints who can remember their various previous existences etc." (The saints who remember their previous births remember them in this form, namely in the form: "I" have had such a bodily frame)". If the import of these words had been (as you conceive it) that there is a (real) Individual, which (in former births) possessed an (other) body, it would follow, that you are professing the heresy of Wrong Personalism, and then the only possible escape (for you not to be accused of this heresy) would be to declare spurious (all the Sermons where Buddha speaks of his previous births)³². Therefore it is clear that in those Sermons Buddha speaks about his person in the common, conventional sense, just as we use the expression "a collection" (meaning its separate parts), or "a continuity" (meaning its separate moments. In one moment we have a collection of the elements of a personality existing

simultaneously, in the continuity of life through many births a collection of such successive moments).

Vātsīputriya. In this case it would follow that Buddha is not omniscient. Since consciousness as well as the mental states are but separate moments, there is not the slightest possibility (for one of such moments) to know every thing (i. e. the arising and disappearing of all elements in every moment). But for a real personality such (universal) knowledge becomes possible.

Vasubandhu. But then you admit the existence of a Self which does not vanish at the moment when consciousness vanishes, therefore you must admit the existence of an eternal Soul, (an unchanging Self along with a changing consciousness, and that would be a contradiction to your own doctrine). As to us, we by no means maintain that the Buddha has an immediate direct knowledge of all (moments) and that this is the reason of his being called "the Omniscient".

Vātsīputriya. How is it then?

Vasubandhu. He is possessed of the gift of omniscience in the sense that the continuity of life which is called "the Buddha" has the force of producing the right knowledge of any object he may like to know by simply directing his attention towards it. It has been said:

"Not in the sense of "all at once"

Admit we omniscience,

But gradually it operates

Like fire every thing consuming !"

Vātsīputriya. How can it be proved (that the Buddha is no permanent personality, but a stream of changing elements) ?

Vasubandhu. It follows from the fact that there are past, future and present Buddhas), as stated in Scripture.

Vātsīputriya. (Where has it been declared ?)

Vasubandhu. There is (a verse in Scripture) running thus :

"Be it the Buddhas of the past

Be it the Buddhas of the future

Be it the Buddhas of the present

They all remove the suffering

Of many sentient beings".

Since you yourself are likewise maintaining that what appears in the three times is elements only and no permanent personality, (therefore it is clear that there is no Ego outside the elements, nor is there any Omniscient Ego, because this would be irreconcilable with the temporary character of these elements).

[§ 8. Examination of the parable of the burden and the carrier.]

Vātsīputriya. If the Individual is nothing else but

the elements (it is composed of), what for then has it been declared by Buddha : "O, Brethren ! I shall explain unto you the burden (of life) and moreover I will explain the taking up of the burden, the laying aside of it and who the carrier is !" ("Listen well, listen attentively and inculcate it in your minds ! I am going to explain ! What is the burden ? All the five aggregates of elements, the substrates of personal life. What is meant by the taking up of the burden ? The Force of Craving for a continuous life, accompanied by passionate desires, the rejoicing at many an object. What is the laying aside of the burden ? It is the wholesale rejection of this Craving for a continuation of life, accompanied as it is by passionate desires and rejoicings at many an object, the getting rid of it in every circumstance, its extinction, its end, its suppression, an aversion towards it, its restraint, its disappearance. Who is the carrier ? We must answer : it is the Individual i. e. "this venerable man, having this name, of such a caste, of such family, eating such food, finding pleasure or displeasure at such things, of such an age, the man who after a life of such length, will pass away having reached such an age". (What for did Buddha declare this ?)

Vasubandhu. Why should he not ?

Vātsīputriya. (The burden is explained to represent all the elements of life and the carrier i. e. the Individual)

dual, if not different from them, must be included in the same). Now the burden and the carrier of the burden cannot possibly be the same thing⁸³.

Vasubandhu. Why ?

Vātsīputriya. Because (experience teaches) that this never happens.

Vasubandhu. But to say (as you do) that an Individual is something undefinable, (neither identical nor different from the elements it is composed of) is likewise inadmissible ! And why ? (For the same reason !) Because such a thing has never been witnessed ! Moreover (if the carrier of the burden be taken to represent something different from the elements), the consequence would be that neither "the taking up of the burden" (i. e. the Force of assuming new elements by birth) could be included among these elements (which we know it is, under the name of the Force of Craving for Life)⁸⁰. The carrier of the burden has been pointed to by Buddha with the express purpose to show that only so much can be known of him : "he is a venerable man, named so and so" and other (common life) particulars ending with "after so long a life he will die at such an age", but he must not be misunderstood to represent some eternal (Soul) or some (real) Individual. (In reality nothing exists but momentary sets of elements), the elements of the former moment exercising (as it were) a pressure

upon the elements of the following one. Hence the preceding moment has been conventionally called the burden and the following one—the carrier of the burden⁸⁴.

[§ 9. *Further arguments of the Vātsīputriyas in favour of the existence of some kind of Individual, stated and answered*].

Vātsīputriya. Some Individual necessarily must exist, (because there are apparitional spontaneous self-birth⁸⁵. The denial of spontaneous births has been (condemned in Scripture, as one of) the wrong views.

Vasubandhu. Who has ever denied spontaneous births ! In conformity with the explanation given by Buddha, we maintain that they do exist. (Buddha has said, namely, that if the elements develop into a new life spontaneously, the result is a self-born apparition). Hence what has been condemned as a wrong view is (the denial of this explanation,) the denial of the fact that such an apparition in a new existence is a (mere) transformation in an unbroken chain of appearing elements, because an apparition consists of elements⁸⁶. But supposing you were in the right, and I am really guilty of the fault you are imputing to me, namely the heresy of denying the existence of an Individual⁸⁷, what would happen ? I never could get rid of it ! For only two ways are taught towards perfection : insight into the four

Truths of Perfection and Ecstasy or the practice of the Holy Path. Neither will be applicable in my case. Insight into the Truths will not do, because such an heresy is not mentioned in them, on the contrary we find the opposite view—the heresy of Wrong Personalism—mentioned. And as to the way of practice it is not capable of clearing up wrong views altogether³⁸.

Vātsīputriya. But the Individual cannot be identical with the elements of a personal life, because (Scripture mentions the Individual as a unit). There is a passage : “when one whole individual appears in the world, it is born”³⁹.

Vasubandhu. This is wrong ! A unit may also be used as a conventional substitute for a multitude, as f. i. “one” corn of sesame, “one” corn of rice (for a multitude of grains) and “one” word (for a combination of sounds).

And again, since you admit that the Self is something that is being born (into phenomenal existence) you must admit that it cannot be something permanent. (Elements that are subject to birth never are permanent)⁴⁰.

Vātsīputriya. (It is permanent in a way, for “being born” is here used in another sense). The elements are (momentary) apparitions which did not exist in the former moment, but the Self is not born in this way.

Vasubandhu. How then ?

Vātsīputriya. (It is born in the sense, that it acquires new elements, casting away the previous ones), just as by the acquirement of knowledge one becomes a priest or a grammarian, by (appropriate) distinctions⁴¹ one becomes a Buddhist monk or a Brahminical wandering ascetic, and by a change in the physical condition one becomes old or falls ill. (In all these cases new elements are produced in something already existing).

Vasubandhu. This argument is wrong ! It is condemned in Scripture. In his Sermon about the “*Real Void*”⁴² Buddha has spoken thus ; “O, Brethren ! actions do exist and also their consequences (merit and demerit), but the person that acts does not. There is no one to cast away this set of elements and no one to assume a new set of them”⁴³. (There exists no Individual), it is only a conventional name given to (a set) of elements”⁴⁴. In the “*Discourse with Phālguna*”⁴⁵ it is likewise declared : “I do not say, O Phālguna ! that the same body assumes a (new set of elements)”. Therefore there is no one whatsoever who assumes elements or throws them off.

But first of all I should like to know : what are you alluding to, when you refer to the (assuming of new elements by) the priest, (the grammarian) etc. ? Is it their personality ? No, because its existence is not proved. Is

it their mind and mental phenomena ? (No, because there is nothing permanent in them), they appear anew at every moment. Is it their body ? (No, because) the same must be said about the body.

Further, (your examples prove the opposite of what they are meant to prove. You maintain namely that the Self and the elements are *neither different*, nor identical, but) just as knowledge and other marks (are different from the body), in like manner the elements must be different from a Self. (If you admit) that the bodies of the old and the sick (are different states), of the same body, we answer that the old and the sick body are altogether new bodies (different from the previous ones. To deny it would mean to accept) the transformation doctrine of the *Sāṃkhyas* which has already been dispensed with. Therefore your examples are not fit (to prove your tenet that the Self and the elements are neither different nor identical). Again if you admit the elements, but not the Self, to be produced anew (in every moment, then you clearly show that both are different and that the Self is permanent. And when you point to the fact that there are five sets of elements in any personal life and only one Self, do you not maintain that the Self is different from the elements ?⁴⁸ (How can you at the same time maintain that it is not different and not permanent) ?

Vātsīputriya. Then I will ask you in my turn. There are four primal constituents of matter, but matter itself is regarded as something simple. Nevertheless is it not taught that matter is not different from its constituents ?

Vasubandhu. This is a mistaken view held by some persons.

Vātsīputriya. By whom ?

Vasubandhu. By those who (like *Buddhadeva*) admit the existence of the primary constituents alone⁴⁷.

[§ 10. Questions supposed to have been left unsettled].

Vātsīputriya. If this be true, if an individual represents exactly the elements it is composed of and nothing else, why then did the Lord decline to decide the question, whether the "living being" is identical with the body, or not ?

Vasubandhu. Because he took into consideration the intention of the questioner. The latter asked about the existence of the Soul as a real living unit, controlling our actions from within. But as such a Soul is absolutely non-existing, how could Buddha have decided, whether it did or did not differ from the body. Fancy someone asking : is the hair of the tortoise hard, or smooth ? This question has already been analysed by quite ancient teachers. (There lived once an Elder of great

learning named *Nāgasena* and a powerful King, *Milinda* by name). This King *Milinda* came to the Elder *Nāgasena* and said : "O Venerable One ! Very loquacious are monks ! If you would answer my question, exactly I have a mind to ask you something". "Please, do ask !" said the Elder. The King asked : "This living being, what is it ? Is it the same as the body, or is the living being one thing and the body another ?" The Elder said : "This question has not been answered !" The other said : "O most venerable One ! did you not condescend to promise at the outset not to give any evasive explanation ? Why then are you telling me that this question has not been answered (by Buddha). These words are by no means 'an answer to my question)". The Elder spoke : "O great King ! Very loquacious are Kings ! If you would answer my question, exactly I also have a mind to ask you something". "Please, ask !" said the King. The Elder asked : "Are the fruit of the mango tree in your palace sour or are they sweet ?" "There is absolutely no mango tree in my palace !" was the answer. The Elder said again : "O great King ! did you not condescend to promise at the outset, not to give any evasive explanation ? Whatfore then are you telling me that there is no mango tree in your palace ? This is by no means an answer to my question) !" The King replied : "But how can I tell you something about the

taste, sour or sweet, of the fruit of a nouexisting mango tree ?" "O great King ! said the Elder, it is just the same with this living being ! If it does not exist, whatfore shall I explain whether it does or does not differ from the body ?"

Vātsīputriya. And why did not the Lord declare that it does not exist at all ?

Vasubandhu. Because he took into consideration the questioner's state of mind. The latter could have understood that the "living being" is the same as the continuity of the elements of a life (and that this continuity) is also denied. He thus would have fallen into a wrong doctrine, (the doctrine of Nihilism).

Vātsīputriya. Why then did not Buddha declare, that the "living being" is a conventional name for a set of constantly changing elements ?

Vasubandhu. Because his interlocutor was not capable of grasping the theory (of elements), since he had no knowledge (of the manner, in which these elements) appear in combinations, being mutually interdependent. This (method of teaching in conformity with the mental capacity of the listerer) can be clearly seen in the following express words of Buddha. (After having refused an answer to the questions of the wandering ascetic *Vatsagotra* about the existence of the soul, he thus adressed *Ānanda*) : "Would it not have been improper,

O *Ananda*, to tell that there is a Soul, since among all elements of existence there is none. And if I did tell him that it does not exist, *Vatsagotra* might have fallen out of one perplexity into a still greater one. He might have thought: "I had a Soul precedently, now I have lost it!" If I tell that the Soul exists, O *Ananda*, there is the danger of falling into one extremity in surmising its Eternity. If I tell that it does not exist, there is the opposite danger of falling into Nihilism!" This point has been explained (by *Kumāralābha*) thus: "The Buddha was pleased to construct his doctrine concerning the elements of existence (with the greatest caution), like a tigress who holds her young by her teeth, (her grasp is not too tight in order not to hurt him, nor is it too loose in order not to let him fall). Buddha saw the wounds produced by the sharp teeth of the dogmatic (belief in Eternity) on the one hand, and by the downfall of (every responsibility for one's) actions on the other. If (humanity) accepted the idea of an existing Soul it lay down wounded by the sharp weapon of dogmatism. But if it did cease to believe in the existence of a conditioned Self, then the tender child of its moral merit would perish". The same author goes on and says: "Since the 'living being' does not exist, the Lord did not declare that it is different from the body. But he neither has declared that it does not exist, fearing that this could

be understood as a denial of the empirical Self. There is namely in the stream of elements a certain "living" in the sense (of action producing) good or bad results, and if Buddha had said that there is altogether no living being, (*Vatsa*) might have supposed that such a "living" too does not exist. Nor did he declare that a "living being" is merely a conventional name given to a set of elements, for in that case he had to deal with a man incapable of realising the idea of Voidness (i. e. the absence of a real personality in the stream of elements appearing in mutual interdependence). Thus it is that being questioned by *Vatsa* whether the Soul did or did not exist, Buddha took into consideration the intellectual level of his interlocutor and did give no answer. But if a Soul did exist, nothing could have prevented him to declare that it did!"

Vātsīputriya. And why did Buddha not settle the questions about the Eternity of the World etc.?

Vasubandhu. For the same reason! He took into consideration the intention of the questioner. First of all, the latter would have meant the (Universal) Soul to be the World. But then as for Buddha no (such) Soul did altogether exist, (every answer such as: it is eternal, it is not eternal, it is partly eternal and partly non-eternal, it is neither eternal nor non-eternal) would have been out of place. If again the questioner had meant by

Universe 'the appearing and disappearing of all (its elements) every answer would have been out of place. For if this (process of life) is eternal, there is no (hope of putting an end to it in) Final Rescue. If it is non-eternal, than it will break up altogether (by itself). Supposing it to be doth : (partly non-eternal and partly eternal), then some living beings will naturally attain Final Rescue (without any effort), and other ones will never attain it. And lastly, supposing it to be neither eternal nor non-eternal (we get a contradiction, namely that) at the same time there neither will be any Salvation nor any absence of Salvation ! As a matter of fact Salvation can be attained by the practice of the Holy Path only, therefore every (direct) unqualified answer would have been incomplete. Similarly (Buddha declined to answer the question of a) learned *Gymnosophist* who taking a fledgling in his hand (asked, whether it was living or not. If he had answered "it is living" the gymnosophist would have squeezed the bird in his hand and shown it dead. If he had answered "it is dead" the Gymnosophist would have shown a living fledgling and thus proved to the audience that Buddha was not omniscient. But the Lord guessed the hidden aim and gave no direct answer. He only said : "as a matter of fact, it can be living or dead, since this depends upon your will").

For the same reason Buddha did not solve the four questions regarding the end of the Universe. These questions have the same import as the preceding four questions.

Vātsīputrīya. How do you know that these four questions about the end of the world have the same meaning as the questions about its eternity etc.) ?

Vasubandhu. (I know it) because the wandering ascetic *Vatsa*⁸⁴ after having proposed (the first set of four questions) proceeded again to ask : "Are you maintaining that all "worlds" (i. e. all sentient beings) are able to find escape or only a part of them (i. e. are there "worlds" eternal and non-eternal) ? *Ananda* the Elder (who was present) made the remark "*Vatsa* ! you have already asked the Lord about these questions. Why are you now repeating them, changing only the words ?" (We know therefore that the second set of four questions have the same meaning as the first).

(*Vātsīputrīya*. And why was the question about the existence of a Buddha after death refused an answer) ?

Vasubandhu. For the same reason ! Because taking into consideration the intention of the questioner, a (simple) answer was not possible. The latter, namely in asking his question, was surmising that the term "Buddha" denoted the (absolute) Soul liberated (from all bonds of transient existence. Since the existence of

such a Soul was not admitted, it was impossible to answer whether it did not exist after the death of the body).

Now we must (in our turn) ask those who are admitting the existence (of a Soul in the shape of) an Individual: why did Buddha, speaking about the living Individual, declare that it did exist (meaning all its elements existing at a certain moment? Why did he refuse to answer the question about its existence after death?

Vātsīputriya. Because he feared to be misunderstood as admitting the existence of eternal (elements).

Vasubandhu. How is that? (Buddha has made declarations regarding future and former existences without fearing to be accused of admitting eternal life). "The time will come, *O Maitreya*, said he, when you will become the absolute Saint, the perfectly accomplished Buddha!" And upon another occasion, when one of his followers passed away, he made a declaration about his former existence, saying: "He was born formerly as such and such a one". How is that? Did he in these cases admit an eternal continuation of life? If it be supposed that Buddha perceived a man's (destiny) previously to his entering the absolute state and ceased to perceive it after that, then it would follow that he did not answer (the question about the existence of a Buddha after death), because he did not know of it, But

this is a denial of our Great Master's omniscience. Otherwise (there is only one explanation possible, namely, that he did not answer the question about the existence of a Buddha i. e. an absolute Soul after the death of the body because) there is altogether no Soul. You are driven to accept (our, the *Sarvāstivādin's* view). If on the contrary you admit that he perceived the existence of a Soul in this case, but was silent about it, then it will be proved that a Soul is existing and is eternal. Or (perhaps you will have recourse to your favourite method and declare that) this also is something undefinable, that Buddha does and does not perceive it at the same time! But hush! hush! do not give voice to such (blasphemy)!

[§ 11. *A further argument in favour of a Soul stated and answered*].

Vātsīputriya. (Some kind of) Individual must exist, since Scripture declares: "to maintain dogmatically "I have no Soul" is a wrong dogma".

Vasubandhu. But it likewise declares: "to maintain that there is a Soul is wrong dogmatism". Therefore this is absolutely inadmissible. The *Abhidharmists* declare both these views to be inadmissible extremes. They are included by them among the heresies as the belief in Eternity and Nihilism. Their view is profoundly logical, since it is just the same view that has been proffered in

the Discourse with *Vatsa* : "O Ānanda ! if we declare that there is a (real) Soul, we shall fall into (the extreme of) Eternity; and if we declare that there is no (empirical) Self, we shall fall into (the extreme of) Nihilism".

[§ 12. *Is there any transmigration of Souls*].

Vātsīputriya. If there were no Individual existing, who is it that does migrate, (appearing and disappearing in different existences), since it is impossible to suppose that the process of life is itself appearing and disappearing ? Besides the Lord has declared in Scripture : "The living beings are migrating. Obscured by Ignorance (and bound by a craving for life) they are wandering about (through birth and death)".

Vasubandhu. But how do they migrate ?

Vātsīputriya. By abandoning one set of elements and taking up a new one.

Vasubandhu. This theory has already been disposed of. (We have proved that life is going on like a moving fire which is consuming a prairie). Although it is disappearing at every moment it nevertheless is called a wandering fire on account of its continuity. Just so does a multitude of sets of elements conventionally called "living beings" wander (to future birth and death) on account of (the element of) Craving for life.

Vātsīputriya. If this (so called living being is a mere combination of elements (without any real Ego), how

could the Lord have declared : "At that time I have been living as *Sunetra* the (venerable) teacher" ?

Vasubandhu. Why should he not ?

Vātsīputriya. Because the elements (of a former existence) are not the same (as the present ones).

Vasubandhu. What is it then (that is now *Buddha* and was formerly *Sunetra*) ?

Vātsīputriya. The Individual.

Vasubandhu. (Impossible because it) would be eternal ! Therefore when *Buddha* says "I myself was this (teacher *Sunetra*)", he means that (his past and his present) belong to one and the same lineage (of momentary existences, he does not mean that the former elements did not disappear). Just as when we say "this same fire which has been seen consuming (that thing) has reached (this object)", (the fire is not the same, but overlooking this difference we indirectly call fire the continuity of its moments i. e. rebirths). Again supposing that a (real) Self is existing, (this Self being very subtle) only Buddhas will perceive it quite clearly, Having thus perceived it they will be imbued with a very strong belief in it, and since according to Scripture "the idea of a Self is followed by the idea of "mine", they—the *Buddhas*—will pre-eminently believe that the elements of their lives belong to them, and this will constitute their heresy of Wrong Personalism. Further,

where the wrong idea of "mine" has found its place, there arises a craving for all that is supposed to be "mine". Thus it will happen that (these would be *Buddhas*) corrupted by the strongest bonds of a passionate love for their own persons and belongings will postpone their Salvation into remote future! (i. e. will never become *Buddhas* !)

Vātsīputriya. On the contrary ! passionate love towards the (real) Self is never experienced.

Vasubandhu. According to this opinion there can be no love for the (pure) Self, this love appears only when something which is not at all the real Self, is mistaken for the Self. This you suppose to be logical ! (But it is impossible logically to prove such tenets. Therefore you are grossly mistaken, when you suppose that the disease of such wrong views reducing Salvation to nought might appear in a natural way within the pale of the Holy Doctrine of Buddha). To summarise : One category (of thinkers, as f. i. the *Vātsīputriya*) admit the existence of an (undefinable) Individuality (along with the elements). Another category (as f. i. the *Mādhyamikas*) declare that there is altogether nothing real, (i. e. the elements themselves have no real existence). These two wrong doctrines have appeared within the pale of Buddhism. There are besides the heterodox teachers, who maintain that the Soul is a quite independent substance.

All these wrong doctrines make Salvation impossible and this is their irremissible fault !

[§ 13. *Memory explained*].

Vātsīputriya. Now, if there absolutely is no Soul, how is it then, that the detached moments of consciousness can remember or recognise things which have been experienced a long time ago ?

Vasubandhu. Consciousness, being in a special condition and connected with a (previous) knowledge of the remembered object, produces its recollection.

Vātsīputriya. What is this special condition of consciousness which is immediately followed by remembrance ?

Vasubandhu. It is a condition which includes 1) attention directed towards this object, 2) an idea etc. similar or otherwise connected with it and 3) absence of bodily pain, grief or distraction etc., impairing its capacity. But supposing all these conditions are realised, consciousness nevertheless is not able to produce remembrance, if it is not connected with a previous experience of the remembered object. If on the other hand it is so connected, but the above conditions are absent, it likewise is not able to produce it. Both factors are necessary—(a previous cognition and a suitable state of mind). Then only memory appears. Experience shows that no other forces are capable (of evoking it).

Vasubandhu. But (if there were absolutely nothing permanent, it would mean that) one consciousness has perceived the object and another one remembers it. How is this possible ? In this case things experienced by Devadatta's consciousness would be remembered by the consciousness of Yajñadatta.

Vātsīputriya. No ! because there is no connection between them. They are not mutually related as cause and effect, as is the case between moments belonging to the same stream of thought. Indeed we do not at all maintain that one consciousness perceives and another one remembers. (The stream of thought is the same). On a previous occasion we have explained the manner in which a complete change is gradually taking place in a chain of consecutive moments. Thus it is that a consciousness which did perceive an object formerly, is (gradually) producing a consciousness which remembers it now. What fault can you find with this argument ?

As to recognition it is simply the consequence of a recollection, (and requires no further explanation).

Vātsīputriya. If there is no Soul, who is it that remembers ?

Vasubandhu. What is the meaning of the word "to remember" ?

Vātsīputriya. It means to grasp an object by memory.

Vasubandhu. Is this "grasping by memory" something different from memory ?

Vātsīputriya. It is an agent who acts through memory.

Vasubandhu. The agency by which memory is produced we have just explained. The cause productive of a recollection is a suitable state of mind (and nothing else) !

Vātsīputriya. But when (in common life) we are using the expression "Gaitra remembers" what does it mean ?

Vasubandhu. In the current (of phenomena), which is designated by the name Gaitra a recollection appears. We notice the fact and express it. It is no more !

Vātsīputriya. But if there is no Soul, whose is the recollection, (whom does it belong to) ?

Vasubandhu. What is here the meaning of the Genitive "whose" ?

Vātsīputriya. It denotes proprietorship.

Vasubandhu. Is it the same as when somebody enquires, of what objects who is the proprietor ?

Vātsīputriya. It is just as when we say "Gaitra is the owner of a cow".

Vasubandhu. What does it mean to be the owner of a cow ?

Vātsīputriya. It means that it depends on him to employ her for milking or driving purposes etc.

Vasubandhu. Now I should like to know to what place must I dispatch my memory, since it is supposed that I am the master of it.

Vātsīputriya. You must direct it towards the remembered object.

Vasubandhu. What for shall I direct my memory ?

Vātsīputriya. In order to remember.

Vasubandhu. Hallo ! I must employ the very thing I already possess in order to get it ! Indeed that is well spoken ! Great is the merit (of such discoveries) ! And then I should like to know, in what sense memory is to be influenced : in the sense of its being produced, or in the sense of its being dispatched, like a servant) ?

Vātsīputriya. In the sense of production, since memory cannot move (like a servant).

Vasubandhu. In that case the proprietor is simply the cause and the property will simply be its effect. The cause has a rule over the effect, and this rule belongs to the cause (only in the sense of its producing) a result. Memory is the property of something which is its own cause. As to the name of an owner given to the united elements of Caitra with respect to those of the cow, this name has been given only because it has been observed that there exists a relation of cause and effect between him

and the movements and other changes in the cow, but there is no real unity whatsoever neither in Caitra nor in the cow. Consequently there is in this case no other proprietorship than a relation of cause and effect. The same argument may be applied to the questions "Who is it that perceives ?", "Whom does perception belong to ?" and other similar questions : (Who feels, who has notion, who acts etc. ?) The difference consists in the fact that (instead of the described state of mind producing memory) the corresponding conditions for a perception are : activity of the senses, presence of the object and aroused attention.

The Soul theory of the Buddhists.

[§ 14. Is there any cognising agent ?].

Vātsīputriya. There are others who argue as follows : (a Soul must exist), because wherever there is an activity it depends on an agent. Every action depends on an agent as, f. i. in the example "Devadatta walks" there is an action of walking which depends on Devadatta, the agent. To be conscious is likewise an action, hence the agent who cognises must also exist⁴⁹.

Vasubandhu. It must be explained what this Devadatta is.

Vātsīputriya. It is an Ego.

Vasubandhu. That is begging the question !

Vātsīputriya. It is what in common life we call a man.

Vasubandhu. This does not represent any unity whatsoever. It is a name given to such elements (of which a man is composed). The elements are meant when we say "Devadatta walks". When we say that "consciousness cognises", it is just the same.

Vātsīputriya. And what is the meaning of the expression "Devadatta walks", (if there is no individuality whatsoever) ?

Vasubandhu. It is an unbroken continuity of momentary forces (flashing into existence), which simple people believe to be a unity, and to which they give the name of Devadatta. Their belief that Devadatta moves is conditioned (by an analogy with their own experience, because) their own continuity of life consists in constantly moving from one place to another. But this movement is but a (series of new) productions in different places, just as the expressions "fire moves", "sound spreads," have the meaning of continuities (of new productions in new places). They likewise use the words "Devadatta cognises" in order to express the fact that a cognition (takes place in the present moment) which has a cause (in the former moments, these former moments being called Devadatta). But is it simple people alone whose language is so inadequate ? Great men have likewise condescended to denote the (mentioned facts) by such (inadequate) expressions, when they were pleased to use the language of common life.

Vātsīputriya. But we read in Scripture ; "consciousness apprehends". What is consciousness here meant to do ?

Vasubandhu. Nothing at all ! (It simply appears in coordination with its objective element, like a result which is homogeneous with its cause). When a result appears in conformity with its own cause it is doing

nothing at all, nevertheless we say that it does conform with it. Consciousness likewise appears in coordination with its objective elements⁵⁰. It is (properly speaking) doing nothing. Nevertheless we say that consciousness *does* cognise its object.

Vātsīputrīya. What is meant by coordination (between consciousness and its objective element) ?

Vasubandhu. A conformity between them, the fact owing to which cognition, although caused (also) by the activity of the senses, is not something homogeneous with them. It is said to cognise the object and not the senses. (It bears the reflection of the objective element, which is his corollary). And again the expression "consciousness apprehends" is not inadequate, inasmuch as here also a continuity of conscious moments is the cause of every cognition. ("Consciousness apprehends" means that the previous moment is the cause of the following one). The agent here also denotes simply the cause, just as in the current expression "the bell resounds", (the bell is *doing* nothing, but every following moment of sound is produced by the previous one). (We can give) another (illustration) : "consciousness apprehends" similarly to the way in which a light moves.

Vātsīputrīya. And how does a light move ?

Vasubandhu. The light of a lamp is a common metaphorical designation for an uninterrupted produc-

tion of a series of flashing flames. When this production changes its place, we say that the light has moved, (but in reality other flames have appeared in another place). Similarly consciousness is a conventional name for a chain of conscious moments. When it changes its place (i. e. appears in coordination with another objective element) we say that it apprehends that object. And in the same way we are speaking about the existence of material elements. We say matter "is produced", "it exists", but there is no difference between existence and the element which does exist. The same applies to consciousness, (there is nothing that *does* cognise, apart from the evanescent flashings of consciousness itself).

[§ 15. *Sāṃkhya* views discussed].

Sāṃkhya. If consciousness is not a product of a Soul, (if it has no other cause than consciousness itself), the following moment springing up from the preceding one, then how is it to be explained 1) that it does not remain perpetually just the same, and 2) (if there be a change), why not in a fixed order of succession, like a sprout, a stem, leaves etc. (produced from a seed) ?

Vasubandhu. (As regards the first point, we answer that) all elements which partake in the process of life are characterised by a constant change, (they have no duration). They constitute a stream in which the next

moment is necessarily different from the preceding one. Such is the inmost nature of every thing living !

(*Sāṃkhya*. There are exceptions ! f. i. in cataleptic states neither body nor mind undergoes any change).

Vasubandhu. If there really were exceptions (to the principle of Universal Change), and if the ascetics after being merged in transic meditation and having reached the climax of it would really appear in a state of perfect identity of body and mind, (without absolutely any change in them), then there could be no difference between the last and the first moment of such a state of meditation, and there could be no spontaneous awakening from the trance in the last moment. (Therefore there is an imperceptible constant change going on even in such states as catalepsy).

(As regards the second point we maintain that in the continuous stream of ideas) there positively is a fixed order of succession; if one idea springs up from another one, it does so with necessity. There is a certain affinity (between ideas), in virtue of which there are ideas somehow similar to others and having the power of evoking them. As f. i. when the idea of a woman is immediately associated (in the mind of an ascetic) with the idea of an impure body, or (in the mind of a married man) with the idea of her husband, son etc., and if later on, in the changing stream

of thought, the same idea of a woman reappears, it has the power of evoking these ideas of an impure body or of a husband, son etc., because they are associated with it, but it has not the power of evoking other (ideas, not so associated). Again the idea of a female may be followed by various ideas arising one after another, (but if we examine them, we shall find) that only such ideas really appear as are either very common (in the corresponding stream of thought), or most intensely felt in it, or (at last) have been experienced at a very recent date. The reason for this is that the Vital Energy⁵¹ of such ideas has more power (to the exclusion of other influences), except (of course) the influence of the present state of one's body and the immediate objects of cognition.

Sāṃkhya. If this Vital Energy (inherent in ideas) has so powerful an influence, why does it not produce perpetually (its own, one and the same) result ?

Vasubandhu. Because (as we have said above) the elements partaking in the process of life are characterised by a perpetual change. In conformity with this principle of Universal Change the Vital Energy itself is perpetually changing and so does its result (the idea). This is only an abridged account of all the modes (of association) between ideas. A thorough-going and full knowledge of them belongs to Buddha. This has

been stated (by Rāhula, the Elder) in the following stanza:

Every variety of cause
Which brings about the glittering shine
In a single eye of a peacock's tail
Is not accessible to limited understanding.
The Omniscient knows them all !

(If this is true in respect of complicated material phenomena), how much more is it with respect to immaterial, mental phenomena !

[§ 16. *Vaiśeṣika* views discussed].

Vasubandhu. Now there are some heterodox (*Vaiśeṣika*) teachers who maintain that ideas are the product of a Soul. (The above mentioned two arguments which were brought forth by the Sāṃkhya philosopher against us) will prove most strong against this *Vaiśeṣika* doctrine. Namely we shall ask: (if the different conscious ideas are products of an eternal Soul) 1) why is the following consciousness not constantly the same as the foregoing one ? and 2) why do ideas not appear in a fixed order of succession, as f. i. a sprout, a stem, leaves etc. (from a seed ?

Vaiśeṣika. (The change in the stream of thought) depends upon a special contact between the Soul and a (moving) Internal Organ ?

Vasubandhu. No ! (because we altogether do not admit the existence of real conjunctions). Since there are none in other cases, (neither can we admit any contact between Soul and Internal Organ). (But supposing conjunctions between elements to be possible), then two objects coming into contact must occupy definite places. The same consequence—namely that Soul and Internal Organ must be definitely localised—follows out of your explanation of what a contact is. (What indeed is your definition ?)—“a contact is a conjunction of what previously was disjoined”⁵¹ Therefore if the Internal Organ shifts its place, the Soul must shift likewise, or disappear altogether, (when no contact between them is to take place). (All this runs against your theory of a limitless, eternal, unmoving Soul).

Vaiśeṣika. The contact may be (between the Internal Organ) and part of the Soul ?

Vasubandhu. It is not admitted that the Soul (representing a unity) is divisible into parts. But supposing the contact really takes places, it nevertheless cannot account for a change in the stream of thought. The Internal Organ itself is admitted by you to be eternally the same (unchanging), how then could its contacts be different (changing) ?

Vaiśeṣika. But then (the change in the stream of thought) may be produced by the change of cognition (which we admit to be a quality of the Soul) ?

Vasubandhu. We will make the same objection (as above with regard to the Internal Organ) : how is the change of cognition to be explained ?

Vaiśeṣika. (The change of cognition) may be produced from a contact between the Soul and the Internal Organ, which contact is influenced by a variety of Forces (inhering in the Soul) ? (The variety of cognitions is produced by the variety of these Forces, while the Soul and the Internal Organ remain eternally changeless).

Vasubandhu. In that case consciousness alone influenced by a variety of Forces will do ! We do not perceive the slightest influence of a (permanent) Soul ! This soul resembles magical formulas "phut ! svāhā !" muttered by a quack when the result is achieved by (simple) medicine !

Vaiśeṣika. But the existence of both these (Cognitions and Forces) is conditioned by the existence of a Soul ?

Vasubandhu. Mere words ! (That is no proof of a Soul's existence).

Vaiśeṣika. (It is a proof !) Soul is the (common) support (for both Cognitions and Forces).

Vasubandhu. Support in what sense ? They cannot be supported in the sense in which a picture is supported on the wall, or a *badara* fruit is supported by a plate !

Nor can the Soul afford them any such support. (Such a relation of support and supported is only possible) between material resisting objects, occupying a separate place, and this is not admitted by you (with respect to the Soul and elements it is supposed to support).

Vaiśeṣika. But the Soul may be a support in another sense ?

Vasubandhu. In what sense ?

Vaiśeṣika. In the sense in which the element "earth" is deemed to be the substratum of odour and other (sensible qualities).

Vasubandhu. Yes, of course ! This example is very much to my satisfaction, because I hold to the principle, that there is no Soul ! Just as there is no earth apart from odour and other (sensible qualities, just so is there no Soul apart from consciousness and mental phenomena). Who indeed has ever had any definite cognition of earth ? (It is simply a special combination of sensible qualities which in common life is called by the name "earth". A special combination of mental qualities is likewise designated by the name "I").

Vaiśeṣika. But how is it then that we use the expression : "earth possesses odour etc.", (i. e. we distinguish between the possessor and the thing possessed) ?

Vasubandhu. We use it in order to distinguish (earth from other substances). We say "earth has odour etc."

in order to make it known that this very odour etc. alone and nothing else is called "earth" just as we use the expression "image of wood", (i. e. the image is wood, apart from the wood there is no image, but it is thus distinguished from an earthenware image etc.).

Again supposing there is a Soul which produces cognitions under the influence of a variety of Forces, why then are all cognitions not produced at once ?

Vaiṣeṣika. Because the stronger Force checks the influence of the others.

Vasubandhu. Why then does not this stronger Force perpetually produce the same result ?

Vaiṣeṣika. The nature of these (our) Forces is just the same as that of (yours). Vital Energy, (it is not constant, but always changing).

Vasubandhu. But then what is the use of surmising the existence of a Soul ?

Vaiṣeṣika. The existence of the Soul must necessarily be admitted (for the following consideration:) memory and all other mental phenomena belong to the category of qualities and these must necessarily be inherent in some substance. Since all other substances cannot constitute a substratum (for mental qualities, the special substance in which they inhere must be the Soul. Its existence is thus proved).

Vasubandhu. No, it is not proved ! It is not proved that these mental phenomena belong to the category of qualities. According to our system *whatsoever exists is a substance*. And this is corroborated by Scripture declaring : "the result of the pure life of an ascetic is *six substances*" (pure physics, feelings, ideas, volitions, consciousness and the Absolute; they are all called "substances", not "qualities"). Hence it is likewise not proved that these (memory and other mental phenomena) must inhere in some substance. The meaning of the term "support" (or substratum of qualities) has already been analyzed above. Therefore this (whole argument) is irrelevant.

Vaiṣeṣika. If there is no Self, what for are actions (good or bad) undertaken ?

Vasubandhu. They are undertaken in the hope : "I will be happy !" "I shall escape misfortune !"

Vaiṣeṣika. And what is this so called "I" (in its true nature) ?

Vasubandhu. It is (nothing else than) the objective element with regard to which there arises self-perception.

Vaiṣeṣika. And what is this object of self-perception ?

Vasubandhu. (It is the continuous streaming of) the elements constituting a personal life.

Vaiṣeṣika. How is that known ?

Vasubandhu. From two facts: 1) we feel attachment towards these (elements, our physical frame, our ideas etc.); and 2) (the notion of an "I") is the common subject for such predicates as "fair complexion" etc. (which have an immediate bearing on the physical or some other element of a personal life). Thus people say "I am fair", "I am dark", "I am fat", "I am lean", "I am old" "I am young". We notice that these ideas of "fair" etc. are predicates connected with the idea of a Self as their common subject. But you do not admit (your) Soul to have such characteristics, (as fair etc.). Thus we conclude that self-perception is simply a perception of the elements.

Vaiśeṣika. (This is only a metaphorical application of the term "I", when it is spoken of as being fair etc.). It is also metaphorically used to designate the body, since the body is the guardian of the "I". Just as a king when speaking of his minister might say: "he is my (second) Self!"

Vasubandhu. Indeed, a useful thing might be metaphorically called a Self, but not self-perception itself!

Vaiśeṣika. If you admit that self-perception may have the body for its object, why do you not admit that it may also have the body of another person for its object?

Vasubandhu. Because it has no (direct) connection (with the body of another person). This self-perception

appears exclusively with it, but not with respect to another (body or mind). (Why?) This is an inveterate habit (to hold to these elements as if they were "mine"), a habit acquired in the beginningless process (of Life's Evolution).

Vaiśeṣika. And what is here meant by connection?

Vasubandhu. It is a relation of cause and effect.

Vaiśeṣika. But if there is no Soul, whose is this self-perception. (whom does it belong to)?

Vasubandhu. This would be the place to repeat all what we have said above on the question "whose is memory, whom does it belong to?", beginning with the words "what is the meaning of the Genitive "whose?" and concluding with the statement "it has the meaning of a cause".

Vaiśeṣika. And what is the cause of this self-perception?

Vasubandhu. It is an idea imbued with Illusion, an idea which has for its object the stream of elements constituting one's own personal life. Through the constant former practice of this perception of one's self it has become an idea deeply rooted (in the habitual modes of thought of mankind).

Vaiśeṣika. And now, if there is no Self, who is it that feels happy, who is it that suffers?

Vasubandhu. It is the substratum where pleasure or pain appear, just as flowers grow on a tree and fruits are grown in a garden, (this does not prove the tree or the garden to be ultimate realities).

Vaiśeṣika. And what constitutes a substratum for pleasure and pain ?

Vasubandhu. The subjective elements of life, the so-called six subjective "bases". In what sense they are constituting such a substratum has been explained (in the first chapter).¹⁵

Vaiśeṣika. If there is no (permanent) Soul, who is the agent that accomplishes actions and who the enjoyer that enjoys their result ?

Vasubandhu. What is the meaning of the terms agent and enjoyer ?

Vaiśeṣika. The agent is the one who acts, the enjoyer the one who enjoys.

Vasubandhu. This is a verbal explanation, it does not explain the meaning.

Vaiśeṣika. The logicians give the following definition of an agent "what is endowed with a free will is an agent".⁵² We see f. i. that in common life some people are free to accomplish some aims, as f. i. we see that Devadatta is free to perform his ablutions, to eat, to walk (whenever he likes).

Vasubandhu. But who is this Devadatta you give as an example ? If you understand him to be a real Self, it will be begging the question. But if you refer to the elements, this agent is not free. Actions in general are of three kinds. They are either bodily motions or speech or thoughts. As regards the body and the speech, their activity is going on under the influence of the foreign will of thought. But thought also, in directing the body and the speech, is operating under the influence of the foreign will of its own causes. Since thought itself (in its own activity) is in a similar condition, there is nowhere any free will. Whatever exists is living under the foreign will of (inexorable) conditions. Neither do we admit the Soul to be an independent cause, therefore it cannot be proved that it is endowed with a Free Will. It follows that such an agent as has been defined by the logicians is absolutely not to be found. If among the causes producing an event there is a principal one, we may call it the agent producing this event. But in (your) Soul we do not see the slightest productive activity, therefore it cannot be admitted as an agent even in this sense.

Vaiśeṣika. And how are actions according to your opinion produced ?

Vasubandhu. A remembrance evokes an inclination, from which a searching state of mind is produced. Then

comes (the feeling) of an effort and this feeling evokes motive energy. The motive energy produces an action. What (on earth) has a Soul to do in all that ?

Again there is no (permanent) Soul, that could (really enjoy) the results (of former actions).

Vaiśeṣika. But (there may be something else with respect to which the Soul) can be metaphorically understood to be the enjoyer ?

Vasubandhu. What is it ?

Vaiśeṣika. Is it not our consciousness (of the results of actions) ?

Vasubandhu. No ! We have already dispensed with the theory, that consciousness is a product of the Soul. Therefore the Soul can have no power of producing a knowledge (of the results of actions).

Vaiśeṣika. But if there is no Soul, how is it to be explained, that there is no accumulation of merit or demerit in the inanimate world ?

Vasubandhu. Because it does not serve as a substratum for feeling. The six categories of subjective elements alone can serve as a substratum (for feeling etc.), but not a Soul. How this (serving as a substratum is to be understood) has been explained (just above).

Vaiśeṣika. But if there is no Soul, how do you account for the fact, that an action which no more exists produces nevertheless a result at a later period ?

Vasubandhu. And if it did exist, how would you account for it ?

Vaiśeṣika. The results are produced from merit and demerit, which are qualities inhering in the Soul, (and which are the immediate products of actions).

Vasubandhu. This argument has been already (implicitly) disposed of just above, when we analyzed the idea of inherence (of qualities in a substratum) and asked for examples illustrating this relation. Therefore (your qualities) of merit and demerit do not at all inhere in a substance, i. e. in your Soul. But neither do we maintain that future results are produced from actions, which exist no more !

Vaiśeṣika. But from what ?

Vasubandhu. (They are immediately produced) from a characteristic change (the ultimate phase) in the uninterrupted stream of elements originating from these (actions), just as the fruit is produced (gradually) from a seed. If people f. i. say that the fruit is produced from the seed, they don't mean that the fruit is produced from a (non-existing) destroyed seed, neither do they suppose that the fruit will be produced immediately from the seed alone.

Vaiśeṣika. But what do they mean ?

Vasubandhu. (It is the immediate product of the ultimate) phase in the process of development, (which

begins by the seed), i. e. after the seed there arises a sprout, a stem, leaves etc, till at last the series is closed by a flower which immediately produces (the fruit).

Vaiśeṣikr. But if the fruit is produced from the flower, why do people say that it is produced from the seed ?

Vasubandhu. Because the (seed) has indirectly introduced into the flower its own capacity (influence). If the flower were not imbued with this capacity, it would not have the power of producing a fruit of the same kind (as the seed). Similary if we say that actions have results, this neither means that an unexisiting action produces a result, nor does it mean that retribution follows immediately on the action.

Vaiśeṣika. And what does it mean ?

Vasubandhu. It simply means that the result springs up from an ultimate phase in a continuity (of evolution which begins with that action).

Vaiśeṣika. What is meant by a continuity, what by a change in it, and what by the ultimate phase of it ?

Vasubandhu. A continuity is a continually reverting of (new moments of) consciousness which are following on an action. Every following moment (being a more or less modified combination of elements), is different from the preceding moment. A change which has the capacity of immediately producing the result is called

the characteristic (or ultimate) change, because it is specially distinguished from other changes, as f. i. consciousness in the moment of death (represents such an ultimate characteristic change, since it is followed by consciousness) assuming a new existence.⁵⁶

(*Vaiśeṣika.* But a present condition of body and mind may have been preceded by different kinds of actions. Among them what are the actions which in the first place will influence the subsequent evolution ?)

Vasubandhu. When many various actions are the starting point (of one single stream of evolution), then those among them that are weighty, near in time, or grown into habit have a stronger power (of vitality), they clearly manifest their results to the exclusion of the remaining ones. Accordingly it is said (by *Rāhula*):

“Among the actions going round (from birth to death)

Those will be ripening first in order,

That are weighty, or are near,

Then those one's got accustomed to,

And (lastly the remaining) ones.”

In a single continuity of a personal life, four kinds of actions can be distinguished : actions of great weight, actions near in time, actions grown into habit, and the remaining preceding actions (of the same existence). Among these four categories a weighty action ripens

first, i. e. it ripens sooner than the three other categories. Among those that are near, habitual, or simply preceding (unqualified), those that are near ripen before the two other categories. Among the habitual and preceding ones, the habitual ripens first i. e. before the (remaining) single (category of actions unqualified). When all these categories are exhausted (i. e. all actions of the present life have given their result), then come actions that will bear their result (in the present existence though they were committed in a previous birth, i. e. such former actions the result of which has to be experienced in a future existence).⁵⁴

[§ 17. *Gradual extinction of all elements of life*].

Now, among the elements appearing in an existence some have the character of retribution for previous deeds. After having produced such retribution the force of these former deeds vanishes, (and produces no further result). Other elements again have the character of homogeneous results, being brought forth by the force of homogeneousness inherent in former deeds. These latter elements, if they are associated with worldly attachment, continue to reappear until an antidote for them is produced (in the shape of transcendent Wisdom). After that such elements only remain as are free from worldly attachment, (which constitute the perfect Saint). They also cease to appear for ever after Final Rescue has

been reached (since then the continuity of elements of matter and mind ceases for ever).

Vaiśeṣika. But the elements which have been produced as a retribution for former deeds, why do they not produce retribution in their turn, just as some corn produced from a seed has the capacity of producing new corn ?

Vasubandhu. The example may not fit in every detail. But even supposing it to be fitting, does it prove your tenet ? Is the new corn produced from the old corn directly ?

Vaiśeṣika. From what then ?

Vasubandhu. The new corn is produced by a new special process of maturation. When the corn produced from the (first) seed combines with such conditions as soil, moisture etc., a special process of maturation is produced. Strictly speaking this corn may be called seed only after having reached the state of decomposition which immediately precedes the production of the sprout. Previously to that, it may be so called only by anticipation (because it may become a seed), or owing to its similarity (with a real seed). What produces the result is not the corn by itself, but the "special modification" it has reached under favourable conditions. Thus interpreted the simile may be applied to the Elements of life, which have been produced as a retribution for

former deeds. Although they by themselves have no force of producing any further result, they might become associated with such conditions as are able to produce good or bad results, f. i, a study of the right doctrine or a study of a false doctrine. In that case the result might become capable of attracting elements either favourable or unfavourable (to salvation). The neutral consciousness arising from among these elements and getting continuously modified might become capable of attracting such elements as will constitute a "special modification" in this stream of thought, and from this special modification, not from anything else, a later result may be produced. Thus the simile might be applied to the Elements of life.

Or we may illustrate this process by another simile, where the new result is produced by introducing a new element. If a kind of red dye is applied to the flowers of a citron tree the result will be a pink citron fruit, produced from a "special modification" in the constant change that the flowers will undergo. But such a pink citron fruit will not produce another pink citron, its seed will produce only a normal yellow one. Just in this manner it must be understood that when an action is neutralised by retribution, this neutralisation must be regarded as final, it is not capable of producing any further result.

I have mentioned here only some rough characteristics of actions and their results, as far as they are accessible to my own limited understanding. But the continuous stream of elements influenced by actions of different force may attain different kinds of special modifications which will produce corresponding results. This is a field accessible to the knowledge of Buddhas only. Accordingly it has been said : "Former deeds are exercising an influence upon later events, this influence manifests itself in various ways, the result of a former deed appears in the course of the manifestations of its influence. To some extent this is generally known, but no one else than a Buddha always precisely knows, what has been the former deed, what influence it has assumed, what is the course of events in which it manifests itself and what will its final result be".⁵⁵

Mere Elements exist ! There is no Soul !
This stainless doctrine of the Buddhas,
In perfect argument exposed,
The Saint perceives in pure intuition.
Wrong, stubborn dogma he rejects,
Professed by blind heretics.
In perfect clearness of his sight,
He calmly wanders through these worlds
Towards life's Repose Eternal.
Like a broad way in broad daylight

By rays of sun illuminated,
 So is this Soullessness disclosed
 By words of sunlike Buddhas.
 It is the only glorious path
 'Twards Final Rescue's City.
 The path is open to the wise,
 T'is trodden by saints in thousands.
 But simple people nonetheless,
 Their sight obstructed by delusion
 Do not perceive the glorious path,
 Cannot conceive that there's no Soul.

Of this deep doctrine for the learned
 I made a short exposure,
 By their schooled mind they will pervade
 The whole with strength unfettered.
 Like poison are they, these learned men :
 One only spot it enters,
 And then pervades by its own force
 All limbs without exception.⁶⁶

NOTES.

In the introduction to our translation of the *Nyāya-bindu* of *Dharmakīrti* (in Russian), we have expressed our opinion about the manner in which complicated śāstra works should be translated. A literal translation of them can be used by those who are able to read the original, it would be rather a guide for reading the text, than an independent translation. If the ideas, and not the words, must be translated, the translator should strive to grasp the idea of the original as closely as possible, and then express it in another language in the way in which a modern thinker would have done it, if he happened to have the same idea. A double translation, one quite literal and the other quite free, would have met all demands. We have given such a double translation of the tract of *Dharmakīrti* on Solipsism (*Santānāntarasiddhi*). For want of space this method cannot be applied everywhere. So we have adopted a middle course giving a fairly free translation in the main text, and subjoining a literal one in the notes in such cases where the departure between the wording of the text and its meaning, as expressed in the language of the translation, is considerable, as f. i. in the con-

cluding § of this translation. The main difficulty in this translation is to be able always to distinguish between the words of one interlocutor and the other, for there are no signs of division in the text. It often happens that questions are understood without being expressed. They have been added in brackets. Although ample use of brackets has been recurred to, it has not been possible to keep to it consistently. The titles of the §§ are of my own device.

1. In the Tib. translation, these 3 stanzas are the closing words of the *bhāṣya*. They are preceded by the explanation of the last *kārikā* of the *kośa* and followed by a colophon. In the Chinese translation of Hiuen-Tsang, the stanzas are understood to be the introductory words of the Appendix (O R.) In our Ms. of Yaśomitra's *vyākhyā*, there is no colophon after the stanzas and the first question of the Appendix is interpreted as an objection to the last words of the stanzas. The Appendix is distinguished from the bulk of the *bhāṣya* by the absence of *kārikās*. *Samghabhadra* closes his work with the interpretation of the last *kārikā* and takes no notice of the Appendix. That the latter is no later addition is clear from its being mentioned in the course of the work, f. i. under V. 25.

2. *puñ-po rgyud kho-na-las* = *skandhasaṃtānād eva*. The *skandhas* "groups of elements" are here the

equivalent of the samskr̥ta *dharma*s, with the distinction that some restricted reality is conceded to the *skandhas* whereas the *āyatana*s and *dhātu*s are mere collections, cp. *kośa* I. 26.

3. Yaśom. refers to a stanza of a *stotrakāra* in corroboration of the fact that Buddha alone among all religious teachers denied the existence of a Soul :

sāhaṃkāre manasi śamaṃ yāti janmaprabandho
nāhaṃkāraś calati hṛdayād ātmadr̥ṣṭau ca satyām,
anyaḥ śāstā jagati ca yato nāsti nairātmyavādī
nānyas tasmād upaśamavidheṣ tanmatād asti
mārgaḥ.

4. six kinds of objects (*āyatana*s or *dhātu*s No. 7—12), Intellect (*manas*) is not an object, but an organ of cognition (No. 6). It nevertheless can become an object, inasmuch as the preceding moment of consciousness is apprehended by the following one. Yaśom.: *samanantaraniruddhaṃ hi mano 'nantareṇa manovijñānena vijñāyate*. *Citta*, *manas* and *vijñāna* are synonymous (cmp. *kośa* II, 34. Cf), Yaś.: *cittaṃ manō vijñānam ekārtham iti yac cittaṃ tad eva manas tadevā vijñānam. ekārtho'syety ekārtham*. It corresponds to the *nirvikalpakaṃ jñānam* of the *Naiyāyikas*. cf. *Kośa* I, 16 and Yaś.: *vastumātra grahaṇam*. But there is a *manovijñāna* (*dhātu* No. 18); it represents no different *dharma*, but with respect to it the *manas* (i. e. *dhātu*

No. 6), represents the preceding moment. Others take intellect here to mean mental phenomena, such as hatred, pleasure, pain etc.; they are cognised directly by self-perception, contrary to cognition by tradition (āgama), fancy (vikalpa) and ecstasy (yoga) (Yaśom.).

5. Yaśom.: "How is it proved with precision that the cause must be the organ of sense? There must be some cause—only this is proved, but not that the cause is precisely the sense organ." The question is solved by referring to the intuition (*pratyidhāna*) of great men (maharṣi) and to universal consent about the existence of (invisible) organs of sense.

6. The Vātsīputrīyas make apparently a distinction between the terms *pudgala* and *ātman*, they are *pudgalavādinah*, but not *ātmavādinah*. But Vasubandhu holds the *pudgala* to be a concealed *ātman* and maintains that there is no difference between *pudgala*, *ātman*, *sattva*, *jīva*, *manuja*, *puruṣa* etc., as far as all these notions are equally incompatible with the theory of separate elements and their interdependent functions. Cf. Kathāvatthu p. a. p. 8 : *puggalo, attā, satto, jivo*.

7. Yaśom.: Vatsīputrīyā āryasammatiyāḥ (sic !). Both these schools are mentioned as *pudgalavadins* in the Kathāvatthu-ppakaraṇa-atthakathā, p. 8, and by Vasumitra and Bhavya. In Hiuen-Tsang's time only one of them, the Sammitiyas, seem to have had

practical importance, cmp. *Rhys Davids* J.R.A.S. 1891 p. 411 f. Although there is a great difference in the method of expounding a scientific disquisition, between the Kathāvatthu and Vasubandhu, still the arguments pro and contra are very often the same. We may conclude that Vasubandhu's exposition represents a fairly adequate picture of the battlefield on which the first dissensions raged at the time of the primitive schism. According to Yaśomitra the tenet of the Vātsīputrīyas represents the following argument :

Proposition : an Individual is something really existing, but it is neither possible to maintain that it is quite the same.

Reason : for an Individual is a name applied to an existence conditioned by the existence of its own causes—the elements.

Example : just as fire is a name applied to a fact, which is conditioned by the existence of its own cause—the fuel.

General proposition : an existence of which it is impossible either to say that it is different, or that it is quite the same as another one which is its cause, and which receives a special name as a product of its own causes—such an existence is a reality.

Conclusion : Hence the Individual is a reality.

In the *Kathāvatthu* the argument of the Vātsīputriyas and Sammitiyas in favour of the existence of Soul is substantially the same, but the form in which it is expounded, in accordance with the old system of dialectics, is quite different. It begins thus (*Kathāvatthu* p. 1, cmp. *atthakathā*, p. 8) :

Sthavira. Do we have any real knowledge of a Soul as a reality ? (*saccikattho = bhūtattho, paramattho = anussavādivasena agahetabbo*).

Vātsīputriya. Yes !

Sthavira. Hence is it cognised in the (same) manner (like all other) realities cognised by right knowledge ?

Vātsīputriya. No !

In giving the first affirmative answer the Vātsīputriya has in mind that there is, in his opinion, an intermediate category of being which is neither transient, nor eternal, neither caused nor uncaused. Soul belongs to this category, hence it is a kind of reality. In denying the second question, he means that Soul is not included either in the *skandhas*, or in the *āyatanas* and *dhātus*.

8. It is clear from this passage that *dharma*s are ultimate or absolute realities, taking the term "absolute" in the second meaning as settled by J. S. MILL., Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's philosophy, 6 ed. p. 50.

9. What has no cause has no practical efficiency, it is practically non-existent. The Vaibhāṣikas admit of 3 kinds of uncaused or eternal (*asaṃskṛta*) existence, but for Vasubandhu they are conditioned existences (*prajñaptisat*). Yaśomitra refers to the celebrated stanza of Dharmakīrti about non-efficiency of eternal substance : It can be rendered thus :

The sun and rain what can they do

Regarding Space eternal ?

Efficient towards our skin they are :

If Soul is similar to skin

It must be non-eternal,

If it be similar to space

It shall be inefficient.

Cf. Sarvad., chapter II.

10. This very important definition is not explained by Yaśom.: *da-ltar-gyi nañ-gi zin-pai puñ-po-rnāms rgyur-byas-nas gañ-zag-tu hdogs-so = grhīta-pratyutpanna-abhyantara-skandhān upādāya pudgalaprajñaptiḥ*. There is a division of the elements into inward and outward, cf. Kośa I. 40. The inward includes *āyatanas* No. No. 1—6. The *skandhas* include elements past and future. Hence the *pudgala* would comprise only the elements of a personal life at a given moment.

11. In order to understand this, some idea must be given of the Buddhist theory of matter. Matter is atomic.

There are simple atoms (*dravyaparamāṇu*) and combined atoms (*saṃghātaparamāṇu*). The first do not appear separately. The combined ones include 4 atoms of "universal elements" (*mahābhūta*) conventionally termed earth, water, fire and air. But it is expressly stated that these are only conventional names, they denote respectively a hard stuff, a coagulating stuff, heat and motion (or more properly levity, for there is no moving substance, but only momentary apparitions). It is expressly stated that these "universal elements of matter" are manifested in their actions or functions. They are consequently more energies than substances. This is seen in the circumstance that the fourth element is motion, the third heat, the hard stuff in water f. i. is manifested by its supporting a ship, the coagulating stuff in a flame gives it its shape and prevents its parts from scattering asunder. They are called "universal" because "present everywhere, in every piece of matter, always in the same proportion, but in some combinations one or other energy may get greater intensity and we accordingly get hard and liquid stuffs, warm and moving bodies. Moreover, there are in every combined atom at least four secondary atoms, what may be termed atoms of quality (*bhautika*): of colour, of smell, of taste and of touch, one of each. Consequently a combined atom consists at least of eight simple atoms. When

matter resounds an atom of sound becomes present in every combined atom, it then consists of nine parts. The number increases in organic matter, the organs of sense being also a special atomic matter. Each secondary atom always has as its support a combination of four universal ones. According to other authorities the number of primary atoms supporting each atom of quality must be eight, two of each element. So it is that in reality a combined atom has much more parts, but it is usually spoken of as consisting of eight kinds of matter at least. And this only in the spheres of defiled matter (*kāmadhātu*). In the higher regions of pure matter (*rūpadhātu*) smells and tastes are absent and the combined atom changes accordingly. It is seen from the preceding that there are no indivisible atoms in nature as conceived by the Buddhists. Contrary to the *Vaiśeṣika* system they do not admit eternal atoms. Like all the other realities (*dharma*s) atoms are momentary existences, having no duration, momentary flashings into the phenomenal world from an unknown mysterious real world. The problem of infinite divisibility is solved by pointing to the character of an element (*dharma*). These elements are supposed to be very subtle, mysterious, rather forces than substances. Hence the very usual confounding of the forces (*saṃskāras* properly speaking) with the substances influenced by

them (saṃskṛtadharmas). According to the Vaibhāṣikas we have in the phenomenal world only manifestations of these ultimate realities, the *dharma*s, but we do not meet them themselves. About atoms cf. Kośa II, 11, about *dharma*s cf. Kośa V. 25, and O. ROSENBERG, Hpoorembi, ch. VII and XI.

12. Litt. (95. b. 2) : and if one must not say that it is different from the *skandhas*, there would be five kinds of cognizable (śes-bya for zhes-bya) : the past the future, the present, the *asaṃskṛta* and the unspeakable. This cannot be said. (brjod-par-bya-ba-ma-yin-pao-hzhes brjod-par-mi-bya-bar-ḥgyur = avaktavyam na vaktavyam prāpnoti). It must be spoken of as neither the fifth with respect to the past etc., nor as the not-fifth.

13. We translate rūpa, when representing skandha No. 1 "physical elements" or "matter", since it is then opposed to citta and *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*. But when it represents *āyatana* No. 7 it may conveniently be translated by "colour and shape", according to the definition of this *āyatana* : *rūpaṇi dvidhā, samsthāna-varṇabhedāt*, cf. Kośa I, 10 and I, 24.

14. chos-rmans = *dharmāḥ i. e. āyatana* No. 12, the greater part of it consists of mental phenomena.

Not to be confounded with *dharma*s as a general term, it then includes all elements, matter as well as mind. *Dharmāḥ* includes *skandhas* 2, 3 and 4. Thus it

ist that *saṃskāraskandha* may conveniently be translated by volitions, for *cetanā* is the chief among the remaining *saṃskāras*, and Buddha himself has used it instead of the whole skandha, cf. Kośa I, 15.

15. ḥgal-bar instead of thal-bar (97. a. 1).

16. myoñ-ba-yin-gyi for yin yul-gyi (97. a. 6).

17. tib. 98. b. 2 : brtags-pa-la (? gdags-pa-la) thuñ-bar-zad-de. Yaś. prajñaptim anupapattitaḥ (anupatanti) iti yatraiva prajñaptiḥ kṛtā ātmeti vyavahārārthaṃ tatraivābhiniṣṭhā ity arthaḥ.

18. litt. 98. b. 3 "here neither I nor mine exists, but suffering being born is only born (skye-ba-na-skye-bar zad-do)". H. Th. has : "there is nothing but the *dharma*s of pain, which are (to be born, or are being born just now, or have already been born and so on)". "Suffering" (*duḥkha*) is in this śāstra a technical term denoting the upādānaskandhas, which is the same as the *saṃskṛtadharmas*.

19. 98. b. 3. Hgra-bcom-pa drug-gis kyañ (?) probably for dgra-bcom-ma brag-gis kyañ. H. Th. has "the bhikṣuṇī-arhat Śilā" and the comm. explains 'śilā' as meaning "a little hill". The pali text has Vajirā comp. Oldenberg, Buddha, 3 ed., p. 298.

20. 98 b. 3 bdud-las brtsams-nas.

21. These verses are found in Saṃyukt. Āg. 16-10 and also in the Pali Samy. Nik. I, 135, comp. Oldenberg,

Buddha, 3 ed., p. 298. The tib. litt. means: a sentient being. O Māra, what do you think (it is)? You have a (false) doctrine. This saṃskāraskandha (for saṃskṛta-dharmāḥ) is void. In it there is no sentient being. Just as an aggregate of parts is given the name of a car, thus having the skandhas as a basis, we give them the name of a quite false sentient being".

22. luñ phran thsegs=kṣudrakāgama.

23. Or: I will explain the dharma which destroys all bonds. . .

24. The Chinese has: "already we see that the "inward" (i.e. that which is contained in the 5 skandhas) is void, (how much more) can we see that equally void is any "outward" (which is not even enumerated among the dharmas). According to Kośa I, 39 the inward elements are consciousness and the 5 senses, the remaining ones, including all mental phenomena except consciousness, are outward, i. e. outward with respect to consciousness, the central dharma.

25. ñes-dmigs=ādīnava.

26. srog-tu lta-bar-hgyur, but H. Th. has instead "leads to various erroneous paths".

27. rnam-par grol-bar mi hgyur=na vimucyate, but Yaś. (yāvan) nādhimucyate.

28. In all this passage the Vats. appear in the third person: de-dag-gis, zhes zer-ro zhes drag-go.

29. dharmatā.

30. manovijñāna.

31. Cf. above § 3.

32. Litt.: if the pudgala had been viewed as possessing rūpa, then, in consequence of the deduction of satkāyadr̥ṣṭi, this would be the occasion for "not being read in the sūtras".

33. Litt. Bhāṣya. P. Bst. vol. 64 p. 100. a. 5. : And also because it would follow that "assuming the aggregates of elements" would not be comprised in the aggregates.

Yaś. comment. P. Bst. vol. 66, p. 389. b. 3—6 : "The carrier"—this is an example. Therefore after having said "it is inadmissible that the burden should be the same as the carrier", he says : "it would also follow that "assuming the aggregates", (sskr. bhārādānasya "taking up of the burden", tib. phuñ-po len-pa=skandhādānasya "assuming the groups, the Chinese has tṛṣṇā "craving" (the definition of which (process) has been given, would neither be comprised in the aggregates", i. e. it would follow that it could not be comprised in the aggregates" just as the carrier (is not). But this we deny. Therefore the carrier is not something differing from the aggregates, just as (the fact) of assuming them is not.

34 *Litt. Bhāṣya. f. 100. a. 5—7* : The carrier has been taught by the Sublime Lord for the express purpose that just so much may be known : beginning with "this venerable man having such a name" etc. ending with "after so long a life he will die at such an age",—that he may not be conceived in a different manner, as eternal, or as a personality. The former aggregates are merely exercising a pressure upon the next ones, hence they are called the burden and the carrier of the burden.

Taś. comment. p. 389. b. 6—390. a. 3 : "The carrier (has been taught) by the Sublime Lord in order that (so much may be known)" etc., after having stated all this at length, it is stated that "he must not be conceived as different". If the Individual had been something really existing, then the Sūtra would have declared simply this : "who is the carrier ? We must answer it is the Individual". But the analysis (of this notion) beginning with the words "this venerable man named so and so" and ending with "after so long a life he will die at such an age" would not have been given. And besides the gist of declaring these details is to make it known that the Individual is a conventional entity. It means : he, namely (the Individual), must be conceived as a conventional existence, the Individual must not be conceived as something different, as a real entity, as eternal, or as something it is impossible to give a defi-

nition of. "The former aggregates etc." means : among the (aggregates) there are some which do oppress and are the cause of suffering, they are styled "burden", the next following ones, those who are oppressed, are styled "the carrier of the burden".

The same passageas translated by Hiuen Tshang:

Vātsīputriya. (1a—4). If there are only the 5 groups of elements, which conventionally might be called "I", then for what reason has the Lord said such (sentences as follow) : "I shall now speak to you about the burden, about the taking up and the laying down of the burden, and about the carrier of the burden.

Vasubandhu. Why should Buddha here not have said so ?

Vātsīputriya. Because one cannot call the burden the carrier of the burden (i. e. the carrier cannot be contained in the 5 groups). And why ? Because that has never been seen before.

Vasubandhu. In that case you likewise should not speak about some indefinable (fifth category of elements), because that too has never been seen before. Likewise (you could object) that, just as the carrier, the taking up of the burden cannot be contained in the groups, since it never has been seen, (that a burden is taking up itself). But in the Sūtra by "taking up" the *trṣṇā* is meant, therefore it is contained in the groups.

The same applies to the carrier, i. e. to the groups (of the present moment) the term *pudgala* ("that which takes different gati's") is conventionally applied. But Buddha was fearing that somebody might say : this *pudgala* is some indefinable, everlasting, true reality.] Therefore in the (same) *Sūtra* Buddha after these words gives himself an explanation, saying : "only following the way of common speech one says that this venerable man has such and such a name etc., as cited before in the phrase of the "*Sūtra* about the man" (*Samyuktāg.* 13. 4). (He is saying so) to make it clear that this *pudgala* can be said to be non-eternal, not having any essence of true reality i. e. the five groups are themselves troubling (P. destroying) each other and are therefore called burden. The previous moments which are *drawing* (Comm. the previous cause bears the result) the posterior ones are therefore called "carrier". Therefore there is no real *pudgala*."

In H.'s conception the carrier of the parable represents the previous moments, and the burden the posterior ones. But Yaś, on the contrary, explains the former ones as the burden, and the following ones as the carrier of the burden.

35 *sems-can skye-ba-pa* = *upapādukaḥ sattvaḥ*. Yaś. explains : *upapādukatvād ity upapadena sādhu-kāritvād ity arthaḥ*, this is translated into tib. thus : *sems-can*

skye-ba-la (for *skye-ba-pa*) *zhes-bya-ba ni skyes-bu-la mdzes-par-byed-pai-phyir-ro.* (P. Bst. v. 66, f. 390. a. 4). In this way are born : gods, the inhabitants of hell and all men in the intermediate state between death and a new birth, i. e. without a seed, not from previous elements, as the Vats. believe.

The whole theory of apparitional or miraculous self-births is expounded and discussed in the III section.

36 Litt. f. 100. a. 8 : just as by Buddha they have been analyzed, so they exist, so (we) say. Therefore this is a wrong view, (the view of) thus censuring (*upavāda* = *skur-ba hdebs-pa*) : "whatever being is spontaneously born into another world, is not a being spontaneously born in the stream of *skandhas*", because the *skandhas* are spontaneously born.

H. Th.: just as Buddha has explained them, so we too explain them, namely if the five *skandhas* (of the intermediate state) proceed to a new life, which begins neither in the womb, nor in an egg, nor in warm moisture, then the result is called *trasfigured being*. To deny such beings, saying that there are none, is one of the false views, since the *skandhas* of the intermediate state must certainly exist.

37 100. b. 1 has *gañ-la skur-pa hdi* for *gañ-zag-la skur-pa bdi*.

Yaś.: eṣā pudgalapavādikā mithyādṛṣṭiḥ. gañ-la skur-pa... could mean : "what you condemn is the wrong theory, the view namely that a spontaneous birth consists of elements".

38 Litt.: "neither throwing away by the intuition of truth will do, nor the practice of ecstasy will do, because the pudgala is not included in the truths." The doctrine of the 4 truths (āryasatyāni "the truths of the Saint") is expounded at the beginning of Section VI. In I, 39 it is stated that some elements (dhātu) undergo extinction through rationalistic insight, others through the practice of ecstasy, and others (the eternal ones and prājñā amalā) do not undergo extinction altogether. The principal element to be extinguished by rationalistic insight is the error of "wrong personalism" (satkāyadrṣṭi) and the 88 anuśayas, which are conditioned by it. But there is no such error as the "denial of a pudgala" included in the list of elements, or in the "truths of the Saint". These truths represent the elements of existence viewed from the standpoint of their gradual extinction by the Saint during his progress towards final Salvation. If the denial of a pudgala had been a wrong view, it would have found its place among the elements, and in the first two truths (duḥkha, samudaya), hence it would have been disposed of by the Saint in one of the pres-

cribed ways. But we find the opposite view included in the list of dharmas under dṛṣṭi. Yaś. mentions that the second way, the practice of ecstasy, is not applicable for the same reason, i. e. because the denial of a pudgala is not included in the first two truths, "or because a wrong view is never cleared up through the practice of ecstasy". H. Th. has included these last words in his translation.

39 Litt.: "if in the world also one pudgala is born, he is born", because it is thus declared, it is not the skandhas".

H. Th.: "there is some one pudgala born into existence, this cannot be identical with the skandhas."

40 Litt "again you must say that the pudgala is saṃskṛta, because it is combined with birth", saṃskṛta is here the counterpart of asaṃskṛta, i. e. eternal existences. Being combined with birth (utpattimattvam) is a token of being not permanent, being momentary, being involved in the process of phenomenal life.

41 liṅga, tib has brtags for rtags.

42 don-dam-pa stoñ-pa-ñid kyi mdo = paramārtha-sūnyatvasūtra.

43 Sc. in the embryonic state, mthsams-sbyor-bar byed-pa = patisaṃdadhāti.

44 chos-su brdar-brtags-pa ma-gtogts-pa gañ-zhig...
Yaś.: dharmasaṃketād iti pratītyasamutpāda-lakṣa-

nāt tenāha yad uta asmin satīti. The import of the tib. would accordingly be, that the only personality existing is the mutual interdependence of all the elements of existence. H. Th. has : there is no agent, it is a conventional designation.

45 bdo-las-skyes kyi mdo=Phālgunasūtra.

Yaś. gives the reference at length : And if you ask what is the acting person like ? I answer : he who throws away, who abandons the skandhas of the next life, somebody really existing. O Phālguna ! I dont say "he takes them", these words would afford thee pleasure, is it not so, Phālguna ? Yes, master ! Therefore there is no one who assumes the elements, or throws them off".

46 H. Ths : (20—4a) "Again if you say that you are supposing the new aggregates which appear to be something "one" (i. e. simple) and which you say are identical with the Ego, being in number not more than one, then positively you must suppose that the Ego is different from the aggregates and permanent. (But you the Vātsīputriyas are also saying that the Ego is not different, and not permanent).

47 smra-ba ḥdi phyogs la-la yod-pa yin-no=ekadeśīya eṣo vādaḥ, H. Ths. "this is the mistake of that school". What school ? Of the treatises of those who suppose that the produced rūpas coincide with the primary constituents".

48 Kun-tu-rgyu smra-byed-kyis "by the speaking ascetic" (?)

49 Yaś. supposes that the view of the grammarians is here alluded to : bhāvasya bhavitrapekṣatvād iti vaiyākaraṇāḥ. But Hiuen Tshang thinks that this controversy about an agent is directed against a Sāṃkhya philosopher. The aim of Vasubandhu is to establish that there are cognitions, but no real cogniser. This may be directed against the Sāṃkhya system where ātman is passive, not an agent. We retain the designation of Vātsīputriya as adversary, because, us usual, he may start questions not only in accordance with his own views (svamatena), but also from the standpoint of an other system (paramatam āśritya).

50 Sārūpyam "coordination" is here meant to explain the connexion between consciousness and its object. It is clear that there is no "grasping" or "apprehending" of the object by knowledge according to Vasubandhu. The objective element is appearing simultaneously with the flashing of consciousness, both are independent, but there is a mutual correspondence between them. This reminds us partly of the Sāṃkhya view according to which knowledge is not influenced by its object, but merely reflects it. We meet this theory of sārūpya in a somewhat modified condition in later idealistic Buddhist systems, comp. Nyāya-

bindu and *ṭikā*, I, 20, 21 and II, 4 in my edition. Bibl. Buddh. VII.

51 We find, this definition in the *Bhāṣya* of *Prasastapāda* : *aprāptayoḥ prāptiḥ saṃyogah*. The definition of the *Vaiś. Sūtra* VII, 2, 9 is different.

52 Cf. *Pāṇini* I, 4. 54.

53 Litt. 108. a. 8 : a continuity is *citta* (H. Th. *rūpa* and *citta*) following on an action and being produced later on; its change is its appearing always in another manner; a change which is capable at the end of bringing forth the result is a *special change*, because it is especially elevated above other changes, as f. i. consciousness at death, which is combined with assuming new existence.

54 Litt. 108. b. 1 : Although there is precedence of various actions the force created by those which are weighty, or are near, or inveterate manifests itself, others not. Accordingly it is said : "of the existing, previously accomplished actions weighty, near, accustomed to, each first, does ripen".

55 This concluding section has been rendered freely, its closer translation would scarcely convey any definite meaning without a previous knowledge of the very complicated theory of different causes expounded in the second *kośasthāna*. Cf. O. *Pozehoepr*, *Apoorembi*, ch. XV

and L. de la *Vallee Poussin*, *The way to Nirvāṇa* p. 88 etc. We subjoin a literal translation :

(108. o. 3). Here the force to produce a *vipākaphala* which is produced by a *vipākahetu* disappears after having produced the *vipāka*. And the force which produces *niṣyandaphala* which is produced by a *sabhāga-hetu* disappears after an antidote for *kliṣṭa*-(*dharma*s) has been produced. The continuity of consciousness of the *akliṣṭas* (= *kuśala* and *anivṛtāvyākṛta*) is stopped at the time of final *Nirvāṇa*. (108. b. 5). But why does another *vipāka* not arise from the *vipāka*, as from a fruit's seed-grain (another seed-grain) ? First of all every thing is not like the example. And even in this case the seed does not arise from the fruit directly. But how ? It arises from a special change which is produced by special decomposition. The form which is produced from it which is the achiever of the sprout, this is the seed of it, not another. The previous course is called seed by a future name or through similarity. (108. b. 7). Similarly also in this case, if from this *vipāka* a *sāsravaśubha* or *aśubha* change of consciousness is produced by such *pratyaya* as hearing etc. the good or not good law, then if another *vipāka* is produced from this *vipāka*, it is produced, in another way it is not, this is similar. (108. b. 8). Otherwise this may be conceived so. Just as from a *matuliṅga*-flower, after it having been chan-

ged in colour by the red lack juice, a red kesara-fruit is produced, from a specially changed continuity in the fruit, but from it no other one is produced, thus from a vipāka produced by action, further no other vipāka is produced. (109. a. 2). This much I have expounded as I understand it. The causes being the influence (bsgos-pa = bhāvanā) of different actions through (their) different forces, having reached this state produce this result—this is the domain of Buddhas alone. Again it has been said : “action, the influence (bhāvanā) of it, the manifestation of it (vṛtilābha), the result of it no one else than Buddha necessarily thoroughly knows”.

56 The concluding verses are rendered according to the interpretation of Yaśomitra. Literally :

1. Having perceived this dharmatā (=nairātmyam, buddhānuśāsanī vā), which is pure through the well-arranged path of argument of the doctrine of Buddhas, having rejected the doctrines of blind heretics which consist in various machinations of wrong dogmatism, those who are not blind proceed (from saṃsāra to nirvāṇa). Yaś.: the āryaśrāvakaḥ are not blind, since they have the prajñācakṣuḥ, they have the knowledge of Soullessness, they are contemplating nirvāṇa with calmness because they are no more afraid of annihilation (ātmoccheda).

2. This Soullessness the only path to the city of Nirvāṇa is illuminated through the lustre of the words of sunlike Tathāgatas, it is trodden by thousands of Saints, although open it is not perceived by the short-sighted.

3. I have expounded this little bit for the very learned, like a spot of poison of a wound it will diffuse by its own force. (Yaś.: there is an analogy between poison and learned men, since both proceed by their own capacity).

Hüen Tshang gives the following translation of these verses :

Thus well we have explained the Path
Which is the cause of pure (Nirvāṇa).
Substantial Elements of Calm, (they are the
Path),
They are the highest Truth, as taught by
Buddhas.
We must destroy the dogma of heretics, dark
and blind,
(We must reject) the fruit of their wrong view,—
in search
Of Wisdom's eye, (which sees that there is
no “I”).
This one broad Path which to Nirvāṇa's palace
leads,

Is trodden by Saints in thousands. Substantial
Elements—
(Among them there is) no "I", (they are the
Path).

(Innumerable) rays of sunlike Buddhas words
Illuminate (this Path), but they, heretics,
Are opening their eyes and—cannot see.
Now of this (Doctrine deep) rectangular,
I made a short exposition, which intends
To open in wise men a (little) gate, (a wound),
Through which might enter wisdom poison-like.

O might you all according to your strength's
capacity

Become enlightened in all that may be known,
So that you might perform exalted deeds
(On all three paths that lead to Peace Eternal.)

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Sarvam Nityam : Eternal existence 3

Sarvam Anityam : Universal impermanance 3

Satkāyadr̥ṣṭi : Wrong Personalism or Soullessness 4

Eternal Repose 4

Sarvāstvādins : Their idea of the world is an assembly of co-operating elements. 5

Niḥsvabhāve : Denial of real substantial existence 6

Vivarta : developed voidness 6

Skandha : Elements I classified into five groups : 1. physical elements 2. feelings 3. Ideas 4. volitions 5. general consciousness.

II classified into 12 bases of cognition i. e. all things cognisable (Ayatnas) cont.

III Classification into 18 component parts of existence (*Dhātū*) is the same as the foregoing one with addition of six (6) kinds of consciousness. 1. Visual 2. Auditory 3. Olfactory consciousness of taste 5. tactile & 6. Intellectual 9-10

Nihilism : The wrong doctrine of extenction, the doctrine of Nihilism. p. 47,53

Vital Energy

Final Rescue 82

Santantrāsiddhi : Solipsism p. 87

Wrong Personalism 29,36,43,55.

ERRATA

Page 9 last line write No. 1—5 and No. 7-11 in place of No-No. 1-5 and 7-11

Write Is for In, In line 3 from bottom p. 15

With for whith, last line p. 32

Opinion for Opinions, last line p. 54

Effort for Effot, line 8 from top p. 50

The for toe, line 11 from top p. 50

Cognised for *Cognized*, line 9 from top p. 21

Those for thsrse line 14 from top. p. 63

APPEARS for appear last line p. 63

Naught for Nought line 11 from bottom p 56